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In the past weeks and months the stability of the 
Economic and Monetary Union has been 
increasingly called into question, at least in 
certain segments of financial market 
commentary. At this critical point in time it 
cannot be stressed enough that what truly 
underlies doubts concerning the EMU set-up is a 
crisis of confidence - confidence in the health of 
the banking system, in the sustainability of 
public finances, in Member States' ability to 
rebalance and grow, but also confidence in the 
political process that governs the crisis response 
in the euro area and beyond. 
The European Council of 28/29 June has 
acknowledged this confidence problem faced by 
Member States and EU institutions, and has 
rightly declared that Europe must move forward 
if we do not want to risk the fulfilment of the 
dire prophecy of markets. It affirmed the strong 
commitment to do what is necessary to ensure 
the financial stability of the euro area, in 
particular by using the existing EFSF/ESM 
instruments in a flexible and efficient manner in 
order to stabilise markets for Member States 
respecting their country-specific 
recommendations and their other commitments, 
under the European Semester, the Stability and 
Growth Pact and Macroeconomic Imbalances 
Procedure.   
The June report on the future of Economic and 
Monetary Union by Council President van 
Rompuy in cooperation with the presidents of 
the Commission, Eurogroup and ECB stresses 
that developing the four building blocks of 
stronger fiscal, economic, financial and political 
integration is necessary to safeguard the long-
term future of the euro. In the immediate term,  a 
critical aspect of the current crisis are concerns 
about adverse feedback loops between national 
banking systems and their respective sovereigns, 
as the latter have increasingly been called upon 
as a guarantor and saviour of last resort for the 
financial system. In order to support either of 
these two entities, both must therefore be 
brought back to health and strengthened 
permanently.  
Fundamental concerns about the viability of the 
banking system and its main actors must be 
tackled as a matter of urgency and with the 
greatest resolve. National systems of supervision 
and banking resolution have proven too 
fragmented to withstand the pressures of a large 
and highly integrated EU financial system, in 
which large cross-border banking groups carry 
enormous balance sheets and cross-border crisis 
management arrangements are largely voluntary. 
The June Euro Area Summit has for this reason 
decided to create a single supervisory 
mechanism, as a precondition for the possibility 
of direct recapitalisation of euro area banks by 
the ESM. The Commission will shortly present 
proposals for a single supervisory mechanism 
covering, inter alia, its design, mandate, scope 
and governance and accountability structure.  
The gains from deepening Economic and 
Monetary Union and from creating a financial 
union could be bolstered by moving to more 
integrated arrangements in fiscal matters. An 
immediate step in this respect would be the swift 
adoption of the "two pack" proposals. These aim 
at strengthening national fiscal frameworks and 
allow for closer fiscal surveillance, and also 
establish a suitable framework for enhanced 
surveillance of programme countries and those 
facing financial stress. Together with the 
ongoing implementation of the reform of the 
Stability and Growth Pact and the other 
provisions in the 'six pack', the adoption of the 
'two pack' would strengthen macroeconomic and 
fiscal surveillance as much as possible within the 
limits of the long-standing 'Maastricht 
assignment', which leaves economic policy other 
than monetary policy in the hands of the 
Member States. Furthermore, the 'two pack' 
would enshrine SGP-consistent fiscal rules in 
national legal systems as foreseen by the Fiscal 
Compact. 
As a means to drive forward Europe's focus on 
growth and prosperity, the June Council also 
adopted a new Compact for Growth and Jobs for 
Europe. The compact presents a coherent set of 
priorities for action at national, EU and euro area 
levels. The onus of delivering meaningful reform 
will to a considerable extent lie on Member 
States, who can identify, design and implement 
appropriate reforms. At the EU level, the 
compact spans measures amounting to €120bn, 
equivalent to 1% of EU GDP. These include a 
reallocation of EU structural funds, focusing 
them on growth and competitiveness, increasing 
the lending capacity of the EIB so as to boost 
investment at the European level and launching a 
pilot phase for project bonds. Finally, we need to 
realise the full potential of the Single Market, 
especially for the services sector. 
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While much work lies ahead of us, one must not 
ignore the comprehensive overhaul of economic 
governance and surveillance since the crisis. The 
June Council's adoption of budgetary measures 
and economic reforms first proposed by the 
Commission on 30 May pays testimony to the 
closer cooperation and coordination at the EU 
and euro area level. The package is the end-
result of the European Semester and represents a 
step change in European policy coordination. It 
comprises country-specific recommendations in 
the fiscal and structural domain for each 
Member State plus the euro area as a whole, as 
well as, for the first time, in-depth reviews of 
macroeconomic imbalances in selected Member 
States.  
These in-depth country reviews examine causes 
of, and suggest responses to, harmful 
macroeconomic imbalances in a number of 
countries selected in the context of the 
Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure. As the 
crisis in the euro area has its roots partly in the 
unchecked emergence of imbalances prior to the 
crisis, these reviews – which follow the Alert 
Mechanism Report published in February – 
directly address these challenges. They conclude 
that the adjustment of macroeconomic 
imbalances is generally making progress, as 
reflected notably in smaller current account 
disequilibria and some convergence in unit 
labour costs. But considerable imbalances 
remain and require the implementation of the 
policy reforms laid out in the EU Semester's 
country-specific recommendations for both 
deficit and surplus countries.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For the EU Semester as a whole, the focus on 
implementation of structural and fiscal measures 
has been sharpened through concrete country-
specific recommendations for each and every 
Member State, building in part on the follow-up 
to last year's Semester, and is underpinned by 
more detailed country analysis. Generally the 
picture is rather positive: although more needs to 
be done, great efforts have been made at the 
Member State level to implement last year's 
recommendations.  
Firm commitment and decisive implementation 
is equally indispensable in relation to the most 
recent June Council agreements. With the 
remaining steps on the path towards a stronger 
euro area having been set out by the Council, the 
implementation of its proposals and agreements 
now becomes vital. With sufficient 
determination and cooperation from all 
stakeholders, the areas of financial supervision 
and assistance, budgetary coordination and 
growth support in both the euro area and EU 
should gather the forward momentum needed to 
move on from the crisis.  
 
MARCO BUTI 
DIRECTOR-GENERAL 
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The global economy has entered a weaker phase, 
affecting the euro area and other major advanced 
economies as well as some emerging markets. 
This backdrop of weaker activity in the major 
global regions may affect global trade volumes 
and somewhat clouds the overall outlook for the 
euro area economy, which is estimated to be 
currently in a period of stagnation. The extent to 
which weaker global demand may act as a 
restraint on euro area exports is the central 
motivation behind the choice of theme for this 
edition of the Quarterly Report, which explores 
external trade developments at the global, euro 
area and Member State level in detail.  
At the global level, the financial and economic 
crisis that hit in 2008 affected goods trade 
significantly more than global output. The 
ensuing recovery of world trade was first quite 
rapid, but seems to have again entered a softer 
patch since spring 2011. Although a potential 
disruption of trade finance does not appear to be 
a limiting factor at the current juncture, the 
repercussions of financial crises in advanced 
economies are likely to continue to weigh on 
global trade, with consequences both for its 
geographical and its product composition. 
Overall, global trade seems to be approaching its 
long-term growth trend, partly thanks to strong 
export demand from emerging market 
economies, but will probably expand at lower 
rates than in the boom years of the previous 
decade.  
Turning to the euro area, the crisis does not seem 
to have accelerated the downward trend in euro 
area market shares observed in pre-crisis years 
but seems to have left a mark at the geographical 
and product level. As the euro area still trades 
predominantly with its immediate neighbours in 
Europe, some of which are advanced economies 
engaged in protracted deleveraging processes, 
emerging markets are becoming the main a 
source of export demand growth. In particular, a 
strong rebound in import demand from new EU 
Member States should contribute to boost euro 
area exports in the coming years. Overall, there 
is no sign that the geographical specialisation of  
 
 
 
exports will be less supportive in the euro area 
than in other large advanced economies such as 
the US or Japan. The euro area is, however, 
facing specific challenges in some export 
sectors, particularly in machinery and transport 
equipment. The trend decline of this sector in 
euro area exports has accelerated since the crisis 
under the combined effect of weak demand for 
investment equipment and durables in countries 
undergoing deleveraging processes and 
increased competitive pressures from emerging 
market suppliers. 
A final chapter investigates drivers of the trade 
performance of individual euro-area Member 
States. It shows that the import content of 
exports is high and rising, particularly in smaller 
Member States. This has important implications 
for the impact of exports on growth and the trade 
balance. A decomposition of export growth 
shows that country differences in export 
performance are mainly driven by market share 
gains or losses within geographical destinations 
and product markets, whereas the initial 
geographical and sectoral specialisation appears 
to be less important in determining export 
market performance. Export performance 
generally shows a certain degree of inertia, 
which may contribute to the persistence of 
external imbalances. Finally, export performance 
appears to be only partly related to price 
competitiveness, leaving an important 
explanatory role for non-price competitiveness. 
From a policy perspective, strategies to 
rebalance current account deficits should 
complement measures to improve price 
competitiveness with measures aimed at 
enhancing non-price competitiveness, including 
through higher competition in the service sector, 
export promotion programmes and the 
promotion of R&D and skilled labour.  
 
ELENA FLORES 
DIRECTOR 
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1.1. The boom, collapse and recovery of 
world trade 
Following the 2001/2002 recession world trade 
registered an unprecedented boom driven by a 
dynamic world economy. The boom began to 
falter at the onset of the financial crisis and turned 
into a sharp downturn in the fourth quarter of 
2008 after the Lehman meltdown. Global trade 
plummeted by 17 % in real terms between 
October 2008 and March 2009. Historical 
evidence suggests that trade is strongly correlated 
with output fluctuations and quite sensitive to 
financial crises, but the most recent trade slump 
appears exceptionally steep. It was about two 
times steeper than in 1930, the first year of the 
Great Depression, and was highly synchronised 
across countries around the world. 
Underpinned by swift policy reactions and with 
protectionism contained, the ensuing initial 
recovery of world trade was fairly rapid. World 
trade bottomed out in the second quarter of 2009, 
and grew steadily thereafter, regaining its pre-
crisis peak already in mid-2010. But the strong 
trade recovery was interrupted in the spring of 
2011, when the global economy was hit by a 
series of adverse shocks, most notably the 
production disruption in Japan following the 
Tōhoku earthquake, the escalation of the 
sovereign-debt crisis in the euro area and the 
increasing uncertainty concerning US fiscal 
policies. Given the recent slowdown of trade 
growth, world trade is still far below levels that 
would have been achieved if global trade had 
continued to follow its growth path experienced 
during the period 2002-08. However, trade 
benefited during that period from a significant, 
and possibly exceptional, expansion of the world 
economy. To the extent that global growth was 
partly fuelled by a global liquidity glut and 
excessive consumption in several advanced 
countries, it is far from certain that global trade 
will return to a similar steep growth trend. The 
most recent trade expansion is actually more in 
line with the trend growth observed between 1991 
and 2008 than with the trend of the period 2002-
08 (Graph 1.1). 
Graph 1.1: Global merchandise trade 
(volumes: 2000 = 100) (1) 
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(1) Trend 1 is based on the period January 1991 - February 2008, 
while trend 2 is based on the period January 2002 - February 
2008. 
Source: CPB 
International trade expanded substantially during much of the past decade, boosted by underlying 
globalisation trends and supported by a benign global environment (‘the Great Moderation’). But when the 
global financial and economic crisis hit in 2008, global trade collapsed, with merchandise trade contracting 
significantly more than global output. Supported by swift policy reactions and helped by the fact that 
protectionism was contained, the ensuing recovery of world trade was fairly rapid, but trade levels are still 
below their pre-crisis path, raising the question of a possibly longer-lasting impact of the Great Recession of 
2008-09 on trade dynamics. The analysis presented in this chapter shows that there is no clear evidence of a 
structural break in the relationship between trade and GDP although the recession may have left its mark on 
the geographical and sectoral composition of trade. In a number of advanced economies, substantial 
adjustment due to fiscal consolidation and deleveraging in the private sector is constraining import growth in 
the short and medium term. By contrast, emerging market economies have been left relatively unscathed by the 
Great Recession. They account for a steadily growing share of global demand and are expected to cushion, at 
least partially, the demand shortfall in advanced countries, while the supply of trade finance does not appear to 
be a limiting factor at the current juncture. There are some indications that international supply chains in some 
sectors have embarked on a consolidation process, with fewer production stages involved and consequently 
less cross-border trade, but there is no broadly-based evidence for such a development. Overall, global trade 
seems to be approaching its long-term growth trend and will likely expand at lower rates than in the boom 
years of the previous decade. 
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Compared with the highly synchronised 
downturn, the recovery of world trade since mid-
2009 has been diverse across regions. Advanced 
economies such as the US and in particular the 
euro area have experienced sluggish import 
growth and were still below their pre-crisis peaks 
in early 2012. In contrast, countries less burdened 
by the repercussions of the global financial crisis 
in terms of deleveraging needs have registered 
robust investment and consumption growth. In 
particular, imports of Asia and Latin America are 
almost back on the rapid growth path of the 2002-
2008 boom period (Graph 1.2). 
Graph 1.2: Real imports developments across 
regions 
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Source: CPB 
The recent deceleration of trade activity has raised 
concerns that world trade could still be bearing 
the marks of the 2008-09 recession. This chapter 
therefore aims to assess whether the global crisis 
has reshaped underlying globalisation trends, with 
possible long-run repercussions on global trade 
prospects. 
1.2. The evolution of world trade and the 
aftermath of the Great Recession 
There are several channels through which the 
Great Recession of 2008-09 may have durably 
impacted world trade. The Great Recession may 
have entailed shifts in the geographical and 
product patterns of world trade since countries 
facing a banking crisis are likely to cut back on 
imports over a rather long period as domestic 
demand is hampered by credit constraints and 
necessary deleveraging in the public and/or 
private sector. Looking at the supply side, the 
global crisis may also have long-term effects on 
trade elasticities and global production structures. 
Finally, distress in some segments of financial 
markets may have affected the supply of bank-
intermediated trade finance. 
Regional shifts in world income growth and 
import demand 
Since the 1990s, emerging market economies 
have gradually increased their share of global 
output, accounting for about half of world GDP in 
2011 (based on purchasing-power parity 
valuation). As a result, the growth of the world 
economy is substantially more broad-based than 
three decades ago when global output expansion 
was largely driven by advanced economies. The 
decreasing regional concentration of world GDP 
growth is reflected in the declining trend of the 
Gini coefficient of countries’ contributions to 
world GDP growth. This downward trend was 
briefly halted by the global crisis when a large 
part of the world economy — mostly advanced 
economies — was actually shrinking and thus 
contributed negatively to global growth. (1) 
However, results based on recent IMF projections 
for global GDP suggest a return of the coefficient 
to the pre-crisis level by 2012 (Graph 1.3). (2) 
Income growth in emerging markets has also 
translated into a rising share of emerging markets 
in global import demand. As shown in the 
previous section, emerging markets have been 
pulling the trade recovery from early 2009 on, but 
even more so since the economic recovery has 
slowed in advanced economies. Since mid-2010 
imports of advanced economies have been almost 
flat and are still below the pre-crisis level, 
whereas imports of emerging economies have 
continued to grow. The comparatively strong 
dynamics of emerging markets’ import demand in 
the trade recovery have been visible for all broad 
product categories. Annual world trade data at the 
product level available up to 2011 indicate that 
demand for all types of goods has recovered faster 
in emerging markets than in advanced economies 
(Graph 1.4). Not only intermediate goods used in 
production, but also imports of final goods have 
rebounded more strongly in emerging market. The 
                                                        
(1) By construction, the coefficient exhibits large values in 
recessionary periods, as a relatively large number of countries 
are contracting and thus offset positive growth contributions 
from other economies. 
(2) Gini coefficients, which are calculated on the basis of Lorenz 
curves, can range between 0 and 1, with a value of 1 
indicating the highest concentration and 0 reflecting an equal 
distribution. For the calculation of Gini coefficients with 
negative values, for example negative growth contributions, 
see Chen, C.-N. and T.-W. Tsaur (1982), ‘The Gini 
coefficient and negative income’, Oxford Economic Papers, 
Vol. 34, No 3, pp. 473-478. 
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difference with advanced economies is quite large 
for fuel and lubricants and capital goods. 
Graph 1.3: Concentration of world GDP growth 
(Gini coefficients) (1) 
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(1) Calculations for 2012 are based on IMF estimates (WEO). 
Source: IMF; Commission services' calculations 
 
Graph 1.4: Change in imports across product 
categories and markets, values 
(2008 = 100: pre-crisis level) (1) 
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(1) Bars indicate the levels of imports in 2011 compared to 2008. 
Source: UN COMTRADE, Commission services' 
calculations. 
Evolution of export shares and product 
composition 
The rising importance of emerging markets in 
world trade has been associated with a growing 
trend in south-south trade that has been only 
briefly interrupted by the global financial crisis. 
The trend has made emerging markets less 
dependent on demand in advanced economies. 
However, with advanced economies still 
accounting for two thirds of emerging markets’ 
exports, global trade dynamics are unlikely to 
fully decouple from output growth in high-income 
countries in the near future (Graph 1.5). 
Graph 1.5: Destinations for emerging markets’ 
merchandise exports (in % of total exports) 
(Q1 2000-Q4 2011) 
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Source: IMF. 
Another remarkable feature of the development of 
global trade is many emerging markets’ 
successful effort to move up the value chain and 
improve the quality of their export portfolio. 
Mostly countries in emerging Asia, notably 
China, and in Central and Eastern Europe are 
increasingly able to enter export markets that were 
previously the exclusive preserve of advanced 
countries (Graph 1.7). 
Graph 1.6: Low- and middle-income countries' 
relative export share (1) (2) 
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(1) Product categories according to STIC, Rev. 3 classification. 
(2) Exports of low- and middle-income countries as a share of 
world exports. 
Source: UN COMTRADE, Commission services' 
calculations. 
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Since the mid-1990s, low- and middle-income 
countries have expanded their market share in 
intermediate product categories such as chemicals 
or medium- to high-tech manufacturing such as 
machinery and transport equipment, where they 
increased their relative export share from below 
10 % in 1995 to 31 % in 2010. This evidence 
suggests that emerging market economies have 
entered a new phase of export-led growth, with a 
shift from being pure volume exporters of low- to 
medium-technology goods to becoming 
sophisticated global providers of more high-tech 
products. 
Sectoral composition of the export recovery 
Besides regional disparities, the trade recovery 
has also been rather uneven when looking at 
different product categories (Graph 1.6). In 
nominal terms, exports of crude materials, which 
are subject to large price fluctuations, had 
exceeded their pre-crisis peak by 30 % in 2011, 
while fuels exports were 23 % below levels seen 
in 2007. However, the latter development is 
largely due to base effects related to the high oil 
price prevailing until the summer of 2008. But 
also several other product categories, primarily in 
the medium- to high-technology segment of the 
product range, have not yet fully reached their 
respective pre-crisis level of 2008. Most notably, 
exports of machinery and machine parts, 
telecommunication equipment, road vehicles and 
other transport equipment are still between 2.5 % 
and 8 % below previous peak levels. Given that 
production of these high value-added 
manufacturing products still tends to be 
concentrated in advanced countries, the relatively 
subdued export dynamics in a number of high-
income countries can be partly attributed to the 
sluggish export recovery in these product 
categories. 
The evolving role of global supply chains and 
trade elasticities 
Over the last decades, global supply chains have 
played an increasing role in industrial production 
as trade and capital flows were liberalised and 
transportation and communication costs declined. 
According to available empirical evidence, 
vertical specialisation in high-technology products 
has increased substantially over the last two 
decades, especially in East Asia. (3) Moreover, 
vertical supply integration is estimated to account 
for nearly a third of total trade growth. (4)  
It is often argued that the prevalence of 
production chains increases the sensitivity of trade 
to changes in global demand (Graph 1.8). It is 
therefore not surprising if attention quickly 
focused on global supply chains as a possible 
explanation of the great trade collapse. Production 
chains allow quick adjustment to changes in 
market demand, but consequently also act as 
channels for rapid transmission of real and 
financial shocks. However, the prevalence of 
                                                        
(3) Amado, J. and S. Cabral (2009), ‘Vertical specialization 
across the world: A relative measure’, The North American 
Journal of Economics and Finance, Vol. 20, No 3 
(December), pp. 267-280. 
(4) Daudin, G., C. Rifflart and D. Schweisguth (2011), ‘Who 
produces for whom in the world economy?’ Canadian 
Journal of Economics, Vol. 44, No 4, pp. 1403-1437. 
Graph 1.7: Global export recovery and product categories 
(exports in 2011, % of 2008 level) (1) 
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(1) Figures in brackets denote SITC, Rev. 4 product categories. 
Source: UN COMTRADE, Commission services' calculations 
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global supply chains in world production should 
only affect the level of trade to GDP and not its 
elasticity. (5) Only in cases where new supply 
chains are developed during upswings or 
disrupted during downturns can the elasticity of 
trade to GDP be influenced by the fragmentation 
of the production structure. 
Graph 1.8: World trade growth and world output 
growth 
(y-o-y change, 1962 - 2011) 
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Source: OECD 
Yet supply chains did play a role in the recent 
collapse of trade. Firstly, the financial crisis 
induced a sharp drop in demand concentrated in 
consumer durables and investment goods, which 
are produced in globally integrated sectors. 
Secondly, the abrupt drop in demand and shortage 
of credit supplies are likely to have caused a 
sudden breakdown of some supply chains, which 
amplified the trade collapse. But in contrast to the 
sudden demand slump, supply-side disruptions 
seem to have played only a minor role. (6) The 
key explanation behind the trade collapse is the 
composition of the drop in domestic demand 
(concentrated in highly traded goods), as shown 
by the sharp trade rebound observed when 
demand recovered in 2009. In particular, the 
strong rebound in intermediate goods trade 
suggests a fairly quick re-establishment of 
production chains (Graph 1.9). Furthermore, as 
discussed further in Box 1.1, there is no clear 
                                                        
(5) A change in the production of final goods requires a 
proportional increase in the demand for all inputs, domestic 
and imported. Hence, the presence of supply chains only 
affects the absolute level of trade, and not the sensitivity of 
trade to changes in total demand. 
(6) Escaith, H. (2009), ‘Trade collapse, trade relapse and global 
production networks: Supply chains in the Great Recession’, 
OECD roundtable on impacts of the economic crisis on 
globalization and global value chains, conference paper 
(revised June 2011). 
evidence of a structural break in the relationship 
between trade and GDP since the crisis. 
Graph 1.9: World imports across product types 
(2000 = 100) (1) 
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(1) Partial data for coverage for 2011 with available data 
accounting for 80% of total global trade. 
Source: UN COMTRADE, Commission services' 
calculations. 
This evidence contradicts suggestions, at least for 
the time being, that the crisis has caused a 
‘deglobalisation’ of production in terms of a 
consolidation of global supply chains. Empirical 
studies of production structures in subsectors 
suggest that supply chains were gradually 
consolidated in some sectors already before the 
financial crisis. Initial observations indicate that 
this tendency towards fewer production stages 
across borders has been in some cases accelerated 
by the global crisis. (7) For some products, the 
downturn in demand may have triggered a shift 
towards domestic production or the possibility 
among surviving suppliers to expand capacity and 
create entry barriers for the successors of firms 
that did not survive the trade downturn. 
Geographically, East and South Asia — and 
especially China — have gained significant 
market shares in the global production network at 
the expense of less-developed countries. 
However, on the aggregate level, the experience 
of the recent collapse and recovery of trade 
suggests that any amplification effects due to 
global supply chains are broadly symmetric across 
the cycle. 
Banking crises and import growth 
Economic history shows that financial crises 
depress imports durably in affected countries as 
                                                        
(7) Cattaneo, O., G. Gereffi and C. Staritz (eds.) (2010), ‘Global 
value chains in a postcrisis world: A development 
perspective’, The World Bank, Washington, D.C. 
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Box 1.1: Global income elasticities and structural stability
Following Irvin (2002) (1) and Milberg and Winkler (2010) (2), we estimate a simple autoregressive distributed lag 
(ARDL) model with quarterly data on world trade (goods and services) (xt) and global GDP (yt) from 1991Q1 to 
2008Q3 (3). In practice, we employ an ARDL bounds testing approach pioneered by Pesaran et al. (2001), (4) which 
is particularly helpful when a level relationship among variables is assumed, while it is not known with certainty 
whether regressors are trend- or difference-stationary. In contrast to other co-integration techniques, pre-testing for 
unit roots and co-integration is not required and it is not necessary that all of the regressors are integrated of the same 
order. The ARDL model of global trade is represented by the following equation: 
    ttt uyqLxpL  ln,ln, 0   
where υ(L,p)=1-υ1L-υ2L
2-…υpL
p and ß(L,q)=1-ß1L-ß2L
2-…ßqL
q are distributed lag functions. For the testing of co-
integration relationships it is convenient to transform the equation into the error-correction form: 
tttjtjjtjt xyxyx     12110 lnlnlnlnln  
In a first step, the lag lengths of the distributed lag functions are set to one according to the Schwartz criterion and the 
equation is tested for the existence of a level relationship between yt and xt based on standard F- and t-tests. The 
calculated F-test statistic exceeds the critical value (upper bound) provided by Pesaran et al. (2001) and the null 
hypothesis of no relationship can be rejected. Next, the equation can be estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS), 
which yields consistent long-run coefficients, and parameter inference is valid using asymptotic normal theory. (5) 
a ARDL regression results (long-run coefficients)
1991:Q2-2011:Q3 1991:Q2-2000:Q4 2001:Q1-2008:Q3 2008:Q4-2009:Q1* 2009:Q2-2011:Q3
Constant -0.03 -1.25 -1.35 : -1.48
(-0.109317) (0.58646) (0.306702) (1.987264)
lny(t) 3.42 1.47 3.19 4.92
(-0.217942) (0.374336) (0.499612) : (1.035489)
lny(t-1) -3.39 -1.05 -2.62 -4.48
(-0.219899) (0.490129) (0.462513) : (1.52705)
lnx(t-1) 0.98 0.86 0.73 0.86
(-0.018731) (0.071955) (0.058434) : (0.299242)
Long-run elasticity 1.17 2.93 2.06 5.27 3.16
Standard errors in paranthesis.
Note: Elasticities for 2008Q4-2009Q1 calculated as ( ΔTRADE/ΔGDP) x (GDP/TRADE).  
Given that the endogenous and exogenous variable has only one lag, the long-run elasticity of world trade with 
respect to global income can be estimated by (ß1+ß2)/(1-υ1). Splitting the sample into a pre-crisis and a post-crisis 
period, estimates yield 1.58 for the period 1991Q2-2008Q3 and 3.16 for the period following the trade collapse, 
2009Q2-2011Q3. These results suggest that the Great Recession might have shifted the historical global trade-income 
relationship. When divided into different sub-periods, elasticity estimates exhibit a remarkable pattern, with rather 
high trade responsiveness to global income in the 1990s and a lower level in the 2000s up to the trade collapse (see 
table above). These results are in line with findings by Escaith et al. (2010), who attribute the temporarily higher 
                                                          
(1) Irwin, D. A. (2002), ‘Long-run trends in world trade and income’, World Trade Review, Vol. 1, No 1, pp. 89-100. 
(2) Milberg, W. and D. Winkler (2010), ‘Trade crisis and recovery. Restructuring of global value chains’, Policy Research 
Working Paper No 5294, World Bank, May 2010. 
(3) Data on trade flows are from the OECD. Global GDP is calculated as a weighted average of 34 countries accounting for about 
90 % of global output over the estimation period. 
(4) Pesaran, M. H., Y. Shin and R. J. Smith (2001), ‘Bounds testing approaches to the analysis of level relationships’, Journal of 
Applied Econometrics, Vol. 16, pp. 289-326. 
(5) Pesaran, M. H. and Y. Shin (1999), ‘An autoregressive distributed lag modelling approach to cointegration analysis’, in S. 
Strom (ed.), Econometrics and Economic Theory in the 20th Century: The Ragnar Frisch Centennial Symposium, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 1999, pp. 371-413. 
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Box (continued) 
 
income elasticities in the 1990s to the transition between two underlying economic models which resulted in an 
expansion of international supply chains. (1) By contrast, other studies find that the income elasticity of global trade 
gradually increased from the 1960s to the 2000s. (
2
) 
In order to identify possible structural breaks in the relationship between global output and world trade, coefficients 
are estimated over the whole estimation range and are subsequently subjected to the stability tests. Using a Chow 
breakpoint test, the null hypothesis of constant parameters (no structural break) can be rejected at the 5 % confidence 
level for the possible breakpoint in 2008Q4, but also for a structural break in 2001Q1. In general, searching for the 
most likely breakpoint tends to artificially increase the F-statistic of no break and rejection probabilities might exceed 
the type-one error even if only one structural break is tested. (3) Therefore, we follow Candelon and Lütkepohl 
(2001) (4) and employ bootstrap versions of the Chow sample-split and Chow forecast tests. In both tests, there is no 
indication of a structural break in 2008Q4-2009Q1 at the 5 % significance level (albeit at the 10 % level in the case of 
the sample-split test) (see graphs below). However, based on the sample-split test statistically significant structural 
changes can be identified for example in 1998 and 2000. 
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An alternative way to test for structural breaks is based on the cumulated sum of recursive forecast errors (CUSUM). 
If the CUSUM moves too far away from the zero line, this is an indication of a structural change. In fact, there is a 
tendency of the CUSUM test to wander off since the late-1990s, which might suggest structural changes in the 
underlying ARDL model. But these developments do not seem to be particularly pronounced since the null 
hypothesis of no structural break cannot be rejected at the 5 % level (left panel of graph below). A major shortcoming 
of the CUSUM test is its possibly low power if various parameter shifts compensate each other in their impact on the 
means of the recursive residuals. Thus, under the assumption that global trade has possibly been subject to more than 
one structural break, the CUSUM-of-squares (CUSUM-SQ) test may be more appropriate. In contrast to the Chow 
tests, they do not give any clear indication of model instability since the CUSUM and the CUSUM-SQ stay within 
the critical bounds of the 5 % significance level (right panel of graph below). 
 
                                                          
(1) Escaith, H., N. Lindenberg and S. Miroudot. (2010), ‘International supply chains and trade elasticities in times of crisis’, Staff 
Working Paper ERSD-2010-08, World Trade Organisation, February 2010. 
(2) See for example Freund, C. (2009), ‘The trade response to global downturns. Historical evidence’, Policy Research Working 
Paper No 5015, World Bank, August 2009. 
(3) Lütkepohl, H. (2004), ‘Univariate time series analysis’, in Lütkepohl, H. and M. Krätzig (eds.), Applied time series 
econometrics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2004, pp. 8-85. 
(4) Candelon, B. and H. Lütkepohl (2001), ‘On the reliability of Chow-type tests for parameter constancy in multivariate dynamic 
models’, Economics Letters, Vol. 73, pp. 155-60. 
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aggregate investment is constrained by credit 
supply restrictions and the worsening economic 
situation, while negative income effects weigh on 
private consumption. As historical evidence and 
recent experience suggest, banking crises often 
coincide with busts in real estate booms, which 
additionally force non-financial companies and 
private households to repair their balance sheets 
and compound the demand slump. Furthermore, 
crisis-induced capital outflows and lower foreign 
investment due to increased risk aversion have a 
longer-lasting impact on imports. On the positive 
side, capital outflows can also entail large 
exchange-rate depreciations that can pave the way 
for a post-crisis export recovery. (8) Thus, the 
rather slow import recovery observed in many 
crisis-affected countries in the last couple of years 
seems to follow a typical pattern. An exception is 
the US, where imports were already approaching 
pre-crisis levels in autumn 2011. (9) By contrast, a 
country’s export performance appears to be 
significantly less affected by financial distress. 
To illustrate the adjustment path of imports after a 
financial crisis, Graph 1.10 compares recent 
                                                        
(8) Ma, Z. and L. K. Cheung (2005), ‘The effects of financial 
crises on international trade’, Ito, T. and A. R. Rose (eds.), 
International trade in East Asia, NBER-East Asia Seminar 
on Economics, Vol. 14, August 2005, pp. 253-85. 
(9) Abiad, A., P. Mishra and P. Topalova (2011), ‘How does 
trade evolve in the aftermath of the financial crisis?’, IMF 
Working Paper 11/3, January 2011. 
import growth in a number of crisis-hit countries 
with the import recoveries in Sweden and Finland 
in the 1990s. Sweden and Finland had to cope 
with severe banking crises in the early 1990s 
triggered by the burst of credit-fuelled real-estate 
and stock-market bubbles. Investment and 
consumption in both the private and the public 
sector collapsed during the subsequent recession. 
As a result, imports decreased by 8 % in Sweden 
and plummeted by more than 21 % in Finland in 
the first year after the crisis and were back to pre-
crisis peak levels only after about 4 years. (10) 
During the same time, exports soared on the back 
of structural reforms to improve competitiveness, 
but were also supported by a depreciating 
currency. 
If a similar recovery pattern could apply to the 
current situation, imports of current crisis 
countries can be expected to fully recover from 
the previous downturn by spring 2012. This 
seems, however, to be a very strong assumption. 
The economic environment in the 1990s was 
much more benign, with a buoyant world 
economy and robust US import demand. 
Exchange-rate depreciation also helped to ease the 
adjustment burden. Bearing these caveats in mind 
                                                        
(10) However, this benchmark of pre-crisis peaks could also be 
misleading as pre-crisis import levels might have been 
inflated due to an overheating economy and unsustainable, 
credit-fuelled consumption and investment growth. 
Box (continued) 
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Overall, estimation results and deduced long-run income elasticities to trade suggest that the relationship between 
world growth and global trade dynamics has changed substantially over the last two decades. The responsiveness of 
trade to output fluctuations has increased markedly after the profound trade collapse in late 2008 and early 2009 and 
has exceeded levels witnessed in the 1990s. By contrast, evidence based on standard stability tests for a unique and 
massive shock at the turn of the year in 2008/2009 with long-lasting repercussions for world trade is rather mixed. 
Instead, the global economy might have been subject to several structural changes over the last two decades and the 
inconclusive results of stability tests for the trade collapse in 2008-09 might reflect the presumption that global trade 
dynamics are more in line with the overall long-run trend. 
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and recognising the recent worsening of the global 
economic situation, the trade-related recovery in 
crisis countries is very likely to be even more 
protracted. Hence, with the large dispersion of 
financial distress across advanced countries the 
impact on global trade might be quite prolonged. 
Graph 1.10: Real import recovery in countries hit 
by banking crises, goods and services 
(pre-crisis peak = 100) (1) 
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(1) Peak dates are: 1990Q1 (FI), 1990Q2 (SW); 2007Q3 (US), 
2007Q4 (ES, IR, IS). 
Source: OECD, Statistics Sweden. 
Given that financial conditions have not yet 
returned to pre-crisis levels, stressed credit 
markets are still likely to dampen world trade in 
the near future. Even more importantly, several 
advanced economies are facing substantial 
deleveraging needs. With both firms and 
households winding down debt levels and 
necessary fiscal consolidation under way, the 
global impact on trade growth is likely to be 
tangible and persistent. 
Impact of financial distress on trade finance 
The financial crisis and the ongoing bank funding 
stress have raised concerns that deteriorating trade 
finance conditions might put the trade recovery in 
jeopardy. Surveys conducted by the Bankers’ 
Association for Finance and Trade (BAFT) jointly 
with the IMF and the International Chamber of 
Commerce confirm that especially large banks 
that were hit by the financial crisis have been 
tightening lending conditions and charging higher 
prices following the global credit crunch in late 
2008. Nevertheless, the overall decline of trade 
finance observed during the crisis is generally 
assumed to be mostly the result of lower demand, 
with supply constraints only playing a relatively 
minor role. Statistics on insured export credits (11) 
                                                        
(11) Insured export credits account for about 10 % of the global 
volume of trade finance, albeit the more risky segment of the 
market. 
show that short-term export credits declined by 
13 % between 2008 and 2009, but have recovered 
since the first quarter of 2010 (Graph 1.11). The 
fact that the volume of short-term export credits is 
still 12 % below its pre-crisis level suggests that 
private credit insurers may have reduced credit 
limits due to the deteriorated risk environment. 
Nevertheless, the largest share of global 
merchandise trade is financed on an open account 
basis or by cash-in-advance arrangements, which 
are not officially recorded. 
The available evidence on the impact of trade 
finance conditions on trade is rather mixed. 
Recent empirical studies suggest that liquidity 
contractions and the tightening of financial 
conditions are likely to have restricted trade 
finance and thus reduced demand in trade-
intensive sectors that are most credit-
dependent. (12) Thus, tight credit conditions have 
probably amplified the trade collapse, even 
though most of the trade downturn seems to be 
explained by the slump in world demand. (13) 
Graph 1.11: Insured export credit exposure, 
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(1) Short-term export credit insurance usually covers insurance 
for trade transactions with repayment terms of one year or less. 
Source: BIS-IMF-OECD-World Bank, Joint External 
Debt Hub. 
 Nevertheless, this relatively benign general 
picture conceals significant local risks. Emerging 
market economies appear to be more vulnerable to 
trade finance disruptions than advanced 
economies. Particularly worrisome is the regional 
                                                        
(12) See Ahn, J., M. Amiti and D. E. Weinstein (2011), ‘Trade 
finance and the great trade collapse’, American Economic 
Review, Vol. 101, No 3, May 2011, pp. 298-302 and Cheung, 
C. and S. Guichard, ‘Understanding the world trade collapse’, 
OECD Working Papers , No 729, 2009. 
(13) Anderton, R. and T. Tewolde (2011), ‘The global financial 
crisis: Trying to understand the global trade downturn and 
recovery’, ECB Working Paper No 1070, August 2011. 
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concentration of banking activities, with e.g. 
French and Spanish banks accounting for about 
40 % of bank-intermediated trade finance to Latin 
America and Asia. Overall, large euro-area banks 
account for 36 % of the market for bank-
intermediated trade finance, whereas US and 
Japanese financial institutions hold market shares 
of only 5 % and 4 % respectively. (14) 
It is too early to draw strong conclusions as to the 
extent to which the latest (and moderate) decline 
in trade finance since 2011 is supply- or demand-
driven. However, there is a risk that the ongoing 
tensions in some segments of the financial market 
could eventually spill over to trade finance, with 
detrimental consequences for global trade if the 
funding problems of major European banks 
exacerbate. Additionally, the particular structure 
of the trade finance market exposes emerging 
markets more than others to the risk of a 
retrenchment of trade finance. 
1.3. Concluding remarks 
International trade recovered remarkably from the 
recession-induced trade collapse in 2008-09. But 
as the world economy began to slow down in the 
middle of last year, concerns were raised that 
world trade could still be bearing the marks of the 
Great Recession of 2008-09. In fact, trade 
volumes have exceeded their pre-crisis peaks, but 
are still substantially below their potential trend 
path. However, the evidence presented in this 
chapter does not lend conclusive support to the 
thesis that the Great Recession has systematically 
and profoundly changed the underlying patterns 
of international trade in terms of a structural break 
in the relationship between trade and GDP. This 
notwithstanding, there are indications that the 
ensuing crisis might have accelerated the shift in 
the regional and sectoral composition of 
merchandise trade. The substantial adjustment due 
to fiscal consolidation and deleveraging in the 
private sector has constrained import growth in a 
number of advanced countries and these 
repercussions of the financial crisis in advanced 
economies will continue to weigh on global trade  
                                                        
(14) World Bank (2012), Global Economic Prospects, 
Washington, D.C., January 2012. 
prospects in the short and medium term. By 
contrast, the disruption of trade finance does not 
appear to be a limiting factor at the current 
juncture. But given the structure of the trade 
finance market, with the large market share of 
European banks centred on specific regions, there 
is a non-negligible risk that increased tensions in 
financial markets and further needs for bank 
deleveraging will impair the availability and 
conditions of trade finance. 
On the positive side, emerging market economies 
were left relatively unscathed by the Great 
Recession and account for a growing share of 
world income, global demand and international 
trade. Thus, low- and middle-income economies 
can be expected to cushion, at least partially, the 
demand shortfall in advanced countries by 
gradually increasing their imports, especially of 
consumption goods. But emerging market 
economies will also continue to play an important 
role in international supply chains. Even though 
there are some indications that international 
supply chains in some sectors have embarked on a 
consolidation process, with fewer production 
stages involved and consequently less cross-
border trade, there is no broadly-based evidence 
for this process so far. Moreover, the strong 
global recovery in intermediate goods trade after 
the Great Recession suggests that the international 
division of labour in terms of the cross-border 
distribution of different production stages still 
tends to shape the pattern of world trade. 
With global demand growth predicted to 
accelerate again in the course of the current year, 
world trade in 2013 is projected to pick up and 
approach its long-term average. However, the 
expected growth is largely insufficient for trade to 
recover its pre-crisis trend volume, i.e. the level 
that would have been achieved if global trade had 
followed its pre-crisis growth path also after 2008. 
Overall, global trade seems to be approaching the 
long-term growth tend prevailing before the boom 
years of 2002-08 and is likely to expand on 
average at lower rates than registered in the 
previous decade. 
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This chapter analyses trade patterns for the euro 
area as whole. (15) It updates work presented in 
previous issues of the Quarterly Report on the 
Euro Area. (16) Elaborating on the trends in world 
trade identified in Chapter 1, the analysis aims to 
give a better understanding of the potential 
medium-term effects of the global economic crisis 
on the euro-area’s export performance and to set 
them against pre-crisis trends. Given the 
importance of the structure of exports for export 
performance, particular attention is given to the 
geographical and product specialisations of the 
euro area. 
Section 2.1 looks at developments in aggregate 
euro-area trade, distinguishing between goods and 
services as well as intra- and extra-area trade. The 
remainder of the chapter then focuses on extra-
area trade in goods for which detailed data series 
are available. Sections 2.2 and 2.3 discuss the 
evolving patterns of the geographical and product 
composition of exports in the euro area, providing 
systematic comparisons with the US and Japan. 
Section 2.4 concludes. 
                                                        
(15) A more disaggregated picture at Member State level is 
presented in Chapter 3. 
(16) See for instance focus on the ‘Export performance of the euro 
area’, Quarterly Report on the Euro Area, Vol. 9, No 2. 
2.1. Recent developments in euro-area 
trade 
Foreign trade in the euro area is recovering 
from a steep drop during the crisis 
Estimates derived from national accounts and 
trade data show that the shares in GDP of exports 
of both goods and services to outside the euro area 
are on a clear upward trend. Both shares dropped 
temporarily during the global economic crisis but 
have since recovered and are currently expanding 
at rates similar to those prevailing before the crisis 
(Graph 2.1). (17) The share in GDP of extra-euro-
area exports reached 18.1 % in Q4 2011, up from 
a pre-crisis peak of 16.6 % in Q3 2008. In Q4 
2011 the share of exports of services was 5.2 %, 
up from a pre-crisis peak of 4.7 % in Q4 2008. 
The 2008-09 global recession had a distinctly 
stronger impact on exports of goods than on 
exports of services. Trade in services tends to be 
less cyclical than trade in goods, in particular 
because services are not subject to inventory 
accumulation and decumulation. This traditional 
                                                        
(17) National accounts for the euro area do not distinguish 
between intra-euro area and extra-euro area trade in goods 
and services. The relative distribution of extra- and intra-euro 
area trade in goods from external trade statistics was applied 
to trade in goods and services from the national accounts. 
As in the case of the US and Japan, the share of euro-area exports in total world trade has been declining since 
the late 1990s. The trend reflects the rapid integration of emerging economies into world trade but also euro 
exchange rate developments. Since 2010, the euro-area’s market share has shown signs of stabilisation, mostly 
due to a significant depreciation of the euro. 
The euro area still trades predominantly with its immediate neighbours in Europe, some of which are advanced 
economies engaged in protracted deleveraging processes. The crisis seems to have accelerated the pre-crisis 
shift towards emerging markets, where demand has proved much more resilient than in advanced economies. A 
strong rebound in import demand from new EU Member States should contribute to boosting euro-area exports 
in coming years and there is no sign that the geographical specialisation of exports will be less supportive in 
the euro area than in other large advanced economies such as the US or Japan. 
The crisis may also have a lasting legacy at the sectoral/product level. The euro area has a comparative 
advantage in machinery and transport, in research-intensive sectors such as pharmaceuticals and in labour-
intensive sectors. It also has a weaker specialisation than the US and Japan in the Information and 
Communication Technology (ICT) sector. The crisis seems to have triggered a move away from labour-
intensive sectors and to have accelerated the trend decline of the machinery and transport sector in total euro-
area exports. There are concerns that it might have a persistent negative effect on that sector due to a mix of 
sluggish demand for investment goods and durables in a number of advanced economies engaged in lengthy 
deleveraging processes and increasing competitive pressures from emerging market suppliers. Deteriorations 
in export shares have been particularly visible in the ICT sector and, to a lesser extent, in the electrical 
machinery and car sectors. In contrast, exports of non-electrical machinery have been comparatively resilient 
to the crisis, confirming the euro-area’s traditional strength in that sub-sector.   
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difference in cyclicality is magnified in recessions 
induced by financial crises, during which the 
contraction in demand (and therefore trade) tends 
to be concentrated in specific categories of goods 
such as investment equipment. Euro-area balance 
of payments shows that trade in transportation, 
travel and financial services were strongly hit by 
the 2008-09 recession, while trade in business and 
professional services proved relatively 
resilient. Similar developments were observed in 
the US as well. (18) 
Graph 2.1: Extra-euro area exports of goods and 
services 
(1999-2011, % of GDP) (1) 
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(1) Based on national accounts; the share of extra-euro area 
exports is from external trade statistics. Based on 2005 prices. 
Source: Commission services. 
After a steep decline during the initial crisis 
period and a rapid recovery in 2010, extra-euro- 
area imports of goods and services are currently 
increasing more slowly than exports. In the fourth 
quarter of 2011, while real exports of both goods 
and services were growing at over 6 % on an 
annual basis, imports of goods from outside the 
euro area were only growing by 2.2 % and imports 
of services by 0.9 %. These growth differences 
between exports and imports are largely due to 
lower domestic demand in the euro area than in 
the rest of the world and, to a lesser degree, 
improvements in external competitiveness. At the 
end of 2011, the euro-area’s real effective 
exchange rate (CPI-based, quarterly averages) 
was about 10 % below its pre-crisis peak 
(Graph 2.2). 
External trade statistics show that extra-euro area 
exports of goods were more severely hit in the 
                                                        
(18) See for instance Borchert, I. and A. Mattoo (2009), ‘The 
crisis resilience of services trade’, The Service Industries 
Journal, Vol. 30, No 14, December, pp. 1-20. 
early stages of the global financial crisis than 
intra-euro area exports. In volume terms, the 
former dropped by 24.0 % from their peak in 2008 
to their trough in 2009, while the latter fell by 
only 21.4 % (Graph 2.3). Recovery from this 
initial drop was, however, much faster for extra-
euro area exports, which now stand close to their 
pre-crisis peak although a downward inflection in 
the growth rate has been visible since spring 2011. 
In contrast, intra-euro area exports, after a short-
lived recovery in 2010, have remained mostly flat 
before edging down slightly since mid-2011 due 
to a relapse in domestic demand in the euro area. 
Graph 2.2: Real effective exchange rate 
(1999-2011, 1999 = 100) (1) 
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(1) Moving average, CPI-based. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
Graph 2.3: Extra- and intra-euro exports of goods 
(volume index, 2000 = 100) (1) 
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(1) Based on external trade statistics. 
Source: Commission services. 
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The export market share of the euro area has 
stabilised 
Looking at the euro-area’s performance in terms 
of export market shares (19), the shares of world 
exports in volumes accounted for by the euro area, 
the US and Japan have been declining since the 
late 1990s (top panel of Graph 2.4). 
Graph 2.4: Exports of goods as a share of world 
trade (index 2000 = 100) (1) 
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(1) Moving average. Euro-area exports cover extra-euro area 
trade only, based on external trade statistics. 
Source: Commission services and CPB Netherlands. 
These market share losses have been to the benefit 
of emerging economies, especially those in Asia, 
which have steadily increased their share of world 
exports by exporting more not only to advanced 
economies, but also to each other. The share of 
world export volumes coming from emerging 
economies surged from 40.8 % in the first quarter 
of 1999 to 55.4 % in the first quarter of 2012, 
while the share of the euro area fell from 15.4 % 
to 13.3 % over the same period. In addition to the 
                                                        
(19) Intra-euro area trade is excluded from the world total in the 
analysis of export market shares. 
rapid integration of emerging markets in world 
trade, the trend losses in market share in the euro 
area were also driven by the euro’s appreciation. 
The decline in the euro-area’s export market share 
was faster in the first quarters of the crisis. This 
strong initial response was due to the relatively 
large share of crisis-affected European countries 
in euro-area export destinations and the large drop 
in world import demand for durable and 
investment goods, which are major components of 
euro-area exports. Since the middle of 2010 the 
export market share losses of the euro area have 
come to an end (though more clearly in real than 
in nominal terms). The stabilisation of market 
shares is mostly attributable to gains in external 
competitiveness. Estimates published in past 
issues of this report suggest that a decrease in the 
real exchange rate of 10 % (as seen between 2009 
and 2011) should boost euro-area exports by 
about 3-5 %, with much of the effect being felt 
relatively rapidly (say in about 1-1.5 years). (20) 
Significant differences in market share 
developments can be observed depending on 
whether volume or value data are used. Since 
1999 the share of extra-euro area exports in world 
trade has performed significantly better in terms 
of values (bottom panel of Graph 2.4) than in 
terms of volumes. Both shares have been on a 
declining trend over the past decade but the fall 
has been less steep in values than in volumes. 
Furthermore, the fall in value has been much less 
pronounced in the euro area than in the US and 
Japan. This is suggestive of euro-area exporters 
being relatively well positioned in terms of 
product quality and therefore commanding more 
pricing power than their US or Japanese 
counterparts. 
2.2. The geographical pattern of euro-area 
exports 
The geographical composition of trade is 
determined by distance and size … 
Euro-area trade is split roughly in half between 
intra- and extra-euro area flows, with the latter 
slightly exceeding the former since 2008. The 
bulk of extra-area trade is with partners in the 
region’s geographical proximity (Table 2.1). The 
UK alone accounted for 9.5 % of euro-area 
imports and 12.3 % of euro-area exports in 2011. 
Accounting for 14 % of euro-area exports, those 
                                                        
(20) For an analysis of the real exchange rate elasticity of euro-
area exports see for instance Quarterly Report on the Euro 
Area, No 2/2010, Box 1.1. 
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new EU Member States which have not joined the 
euro also represent a major trading partner. A 
significant share of euro-area trade also takes 
place with non-EU European countries. These are 
countries that are close geographically, such as 
Switzerland and Norway, or are somewhat more 
peripheral in the European continent but are large, 
such as Russia and Turkey. 
The group of geographically distant euro-area 
trade partners is dominated by the largest global 
importers and exporters. Some of them are 
advanced economies, such as the US, while others 
are emerging, such as China, India and Brazil. In 
2011, the share of the US in euro-area exports was 
11.4 % while the share of Brazil, Russia, India and 
China (the BRICs) was 14.8 %. 
These figures show that geographical proximity 
and relative country size are important 
determinants of geographical euro-area trade 
patterns. Unsurprisingly, this is also true for other 
leading advanced economies. Due to its specific 
geographic configuration (with a comparatively 
limited number of direct neighbouring countries), 
the US has a more concentrated geographical 
distribution of trade partners than the euro area. 
Trade with Canada and Mexico represented more 
than a third of US exports in 2011. Beyond these 
immediate neighbours, the other two large 
advanced economies, Japan and the euro area, as 
well as emerging economies in Latin America and 
East Asia, account for a substantial share of US 
trade. 
Japan trades predominantly with the US and 
countries in Asia. By 2011, China had become 
Japan’s largest trade partner in terms of both 
imports and exports. The US is a more important 
trade partner for Japan than for the euro area. 
… with faster-growing emerging economies 
becoming increasingly important 
Trade between the euro area and emerging 
markets increased substantially in the last decade. 
The growth was essentially spurred by the rapid 
integration of emerging markets into the world 
economy discussed in Chapter 1 and is therefore 
evident in the US and Japan too. Within the 
emerging market category, Brazil, Russia, India 
and China (the BRICs) stand out. The very rapid 
growth in trade with the BRICs between 1999 and 
2007 transformed the group into a major euro-area 
trade partner (Table 2.2). Trade with the BRICs 
was initially based on traditional comparative 
advantage, with BRICs’ exports essentially driven 
by large endowments in natural resources and 
labour and BRICs’ imports of manufactured 
goods fuelled by strong domestic demand. In 
recent years, however, a shift of BRICs’ exports 
towards goods of higher quality and higher 
technological content has been clearly visible, 
most notably for China. 
The dynamics of trade intensification between 
advanced economies and emerging markets 
reflects not only a general trend of integration into 
world markets but also geographical specificities. 
The euro area being geographically close to the 
 
Table 2.1: Geographical breakdown of exports (in %) 
1999 2007 2011 1999 2007 2011 1999 2007 2011 99-07 07-10
EA 17 n.a n.a n.a 15.5 15.4 13.0 14.0 11.1 8.6 8.3 1.2
US 16.4 13.1 11.4 n.a. n.a n.a. 31.1 20.4 15.5 5.0 0.3
Japan 3.3 2.3 2.3 8.2 5.3 4.3 n.a. n.a. n.a. 5.7 4.8
Brazil 1.5 1.2 1.7 1.9 2.2 2.9 0.5 0.6 0.8 7.7 15.6
Russia 1.6 4.6 4.6 0.3 0.6 0.5 0.1 1.5 1.4 22.7 8.8
India 0.9 1.5 1.8 0.5 1.5 1.5 0.6 0.9 1.3 16.6 18.3
China 1.9 4.1 6.7 1.8 5.4 6.7 5.6 15.3 19.7 20.6 14.7
UK,DK,SE 25.8 21.3 17.7 6.3 4.9 4.2 4.0 2.7 2.3 6.9 -3.6
EFTA 8.1 7.1 7.5 1.5 1.8 1.9 0.9 0.6 1.3 10.6 n.a
Non-euro NMS(3) 8.9 13.9 13.9 0.3 0.7 0.6 0.3 1.0 0.8 20.1 -4.5
East Asia(4) 5.9 5.5 6.1 9.8 9.2 9.7 28.1 29.4 31.8 8.0 2.9(5)
Latin America(5) 3.7 3.3 3.4 18.3 18.9 22.2 3.8 4.1 4.4 7.5 3.9
Africa 5.7 5.8 6.4 1.4 1.9 2.0 1.3 1.6 1.6 11.9 3.0
Rest of the world 16.3 16.2 16.6 34.2 32.3 30.3 9.8 10.9 10.6 8.3 -0.1
Import growth(1)
Share of total exports
EA 17(2) US Japan
 
(1) Average annual growth in EUR. (2) Excl. trade between members. (3) BG, CZ, HU, LT, LV, PL, RO. (4) Hong Kong, Indonesia, South 
Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Taiwan. (5) Excl. Brazil. 
Source: Commission services and UN Comtrade. 
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(non-euro) new EU Member States or to Russia, 
the share of these destinations in euro-area total 
exports has increased more rapidly than for the 
US or Japan. Conversely, Japan has benefited 
more than the other two advanced economies 
from trade integration with East Asia. 
 
Table 2.2: Trade growth  
(1999-2007 in %) (1) 
Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports
EA 17 n.a n.a 4.5 3.6 2.6 0.7
US 2.6 5.1 n.a n.a -2.2 -1.7
Japan 1.3 3.4 -1.8 -1.8 n.a n.a
BRICs 16.5 15.6 11.1 14.5 8.3 18.7
Other emerging 
economies(2)
10.4 9.1 8.2 6.8 9.6 9.2
EA 17 US Japan
 
(1) Average annual growth in EUR. (2) Average of Africa, Latin 
America, East Asia and non-euro area new EU 27 Member 
States. 
Source: Commission services and UN Comtrade. 
 
The crisis had a mixed impact on the euro-
area’s geographical export structure 
The global crisis seems to have altered some of 
the pre-crisis trends in the geographical 
composition of euro-area exports. Overall gains in 
the share of emerging markets have continued 
since 2007 although some shifts within this bloc 
are noticeable. Emerging countries that were 
relatively less affected by the crisis, such as China 
and Brazil, have moved up the ranking of top 
euro-area export destinations faster since 2007. A 
pick-up of the relative importance of East Asia, 
Africa and, to a lesser degree, Latin America is 
also visible. Conversely, after a surge in pre-crisis 
years, the share in total euro-area exports of new 
EU Member States remained broadly stable 
between 2007 and 2011, reflecting the intensity of 
the crisis in most of these countries. 
The global crisis also seems to have speeded up 
the decline in the share of some advanced 
economies such as the UK in total euro-area 
exports. This can be explained by the weakness of 
domestic demand in these countries, which face 
protracted balance sheet adjustment processes in 
the private and/or the public sector. But recent 
shifts in the export structure do not only reflect 
factors such as deleveraging and the changing 
structure of global trade. They have also been 
driven by potentially more short-term 
developments such as exchange rate fluctuations. 
For instance, exports from the euro area to 
Switzerland have been boosted by the 
depreciation of the euro against the Swiss franc. 
The franc gained 8.6 % in nominal terms against 
the euro in 2010 and another 10.7 % in 2011. As a 
result, in 2011 the share of Switzerland in euro-
area exports climbed back to 6.3 %, close to its 
value in 1999. Conversely, exports to the UK 
have been hampered (in addition to weak demand) 
by the depreciation of the British Pound. 
The short- to medium-term implications of these 
changes in the geographical structure of euro-area 
exports are difficult to assess. In pre-crisis years, 
the euro area tended to offset a comparative 
disadvantage in trade with emerging Asia and 
Latin America with a comparative advantage in 
trade with new EU Member States and Russia. Its 
specialisation has proved to be relatively 
unfavourable during the global crisis, in particular 
due to sharp slumps in some new EU Member 
States. To check whether this remains true for the 
near future, Table 2.3 presents import growth for 
major destinations as projected in the European 
Commission’s spring forecast for 2012 and 2013. 
Although import demand in countries mired in 
balance sheet adjustment processes such as the 
UK will remain comparatively sluggish, the 
overall import demand addressed to the euro area 
is projected to grow only slightly slower over the 
two years considered than for the US and Japan 
(first row of Table 2.3). This mainly reflects a 
strong rebound in import demand in new EU 
countries. Hence, although the global crisis seems 
to have affected geographical trade patterns, this 
should not translate into a major handicap for 
euro-area exports over the short to medium term. 
 
Table 2.3: Potential nominal export growth, 
2011-2013 (%) 
Euro area US Japan Import growth 
2011-13(1)
Weighted demand for 
exports from…(1)(2) 6.2 6.8 6.6
Share in total exports
Euro area n.a 13.0 8.6 5.0
US 11.4 n.a. 15.5 7.0
Japan 2.3 4.3 n.a. 6.7
BRICs 14.8 11.7 23.2 5.9
of which Russia 4.6 0.5 1.4 5.3
UK,DK,SE 17.7 4.2 2.3 4.0
EFTA 7.5 1.9 1.3 6.4
Non-euro NMS(3) 13.9 0.6 0.8 7.5
Other(4) 13.8 45.0 21.9 6.9  
(1) Forecast average annual growth in EUR (PPS). (2) Export- 
weighted import demand in export destinations. (3) BG, CZ, HU, 
LT, LV, PL, RO. (4) HR, MK, TR, RS, ME, CA, KO, HK, AU, 
NZ, MX, ID, AR, SA, ZA. 
Source: Commission services and UN Comtrade. 
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2.3. The sectoral pattern of euro-area 
exports 
The general picture 
Table 2.4 shows the sectoral structure of exports 
for the euro area, the US and Japan over the 
period 1999-2011 and compares it to the sectoral 
composition of world imports. In all three regions, 
the broad sector ‘machinery and transport 
equipment’ accounts for the largest share of total 
exports (close to 50 % in the case of the euro 
area), with Japan clearly ahead of the two other 
regions in that respect. The euro-area export 
structure appears more diversified than that of the 
other two regions, with a larger share of food and 
beverages, chemicals and ‘other manufacturing’. 
A comparison of the product structure of euro-
area exports with the structure of world trade (last 
column of Table 2.4) provides some indication of 
the region’s comparative advantage. In general, 
the euro-area export structure is closer to the 
world trade structure than that of the US or Japan, 
suggesting a less clear-cut comparative advantage. 
Like the US and Japan, the euro area has a clear 
relative specialisation (i.e. a higher share in total 
exports than the world at large) in machinery and 
transport equipment. Within this very large sector, 
the picture is contrasted, with a relative 
specialisation in sub-sectors such as non-electrical 
machinery and transport equipment but a weaker 
presence in sectors such as ICT equipment and 
electrical machinery. Unlike the US and Japan, 
the euro area also posts a relative specialisation in 
chemicals. Reflecting its endowments in natural 
resources, its exports are comparatively smaller in 
raw materials and fuels. 
 
Table 2.4: Product shares in total exports and in 
world imports (average in %) 
Euro area US Japan
World 
imports
1999-2011 1999-2011 1999-2011 1999-2010
Food, beverages and oils 6.5 6.4 0.5 6.8
Crude materials 1.8 4.5 1.1 3.7
Fuels 4.0 3.3 1.0 12.3
Chemicals 15.3 12.0 8.8 10.7
Machinery and transport 
equipment
43.8 47.3 64.1 37.4
Other manufacturing 25.7 21.3 19.6 25.3
Other commodities and 
transactions
2.8 5.3 4.9 3.7
 
Source: UN Comtrade, Commission services. 
 
Useful insights can also be gained by classifying 
exports according to their factor intensity. The 
euro area mainly specialises in the export of 
capital- and ‘difficult to imitate’ research-
intensive goods, but also exhibits a small 
comparative advantage in labour-intensive goods 
relative to the US and Japan. (21) 
The specialisation of the euro area in research-
intensive goods is not as strong as that of the US 
and Japan, which, unlike the euro area, have a 
strong comparative advantage in ICT sectors. The 
euro-area’s share of ICT exports, such as office 
and data-processing machinery and 
telecommunication equipment, in total exports is 
remarkably lower than in the US and Japan. 
Nevertheless, the euro area has a strong position 
in non-ICT high-tech sectors such as 
pharmaceuticals (4.7 % of its total exports) and, to 
a lesser extent, aircraft (2.8 % of total exports). 
 
Table 2.5: Export shares by factor intensity 
(averages in %) 
Euro area US Japan
World 
imports
1999-2011 1999-2011 1999-2011 1999-2010
Raw material-
intensive
10.9 14.0 2.5 22.7
Labour-intensive 18.2 14.6 7.4 17.8
Capital-intensive 20.5 13.6 29.6 16.7
Research-intensive 50.4 57.8 60.5 42.8
 
Source: UN Comtrade, Commission services. 
 
At first sight, the export specialisation of the euro 
area appears somewhat less conducive to growth 
than that of the US or Japan, due to a weaker 
presence in fast-growing ICT sectors. However, 
as indicated by the overall market share 
developments (particularly in nominal prices) 
presented in the introductory section, there is no 
evidence that the export specialisation is 
systematically less supportive in the euro area 
than in the US or Japan. This may be explained by 
several factors discussed further hereafter. First, 
competitive pressures in ICT (particularly from 
emerging markets) are generally high and 
competitive advantages in that sector can be 
difficult to maintain. Second, the euro area is 
specialised in research-intensive sectors such as 
pharmaceuticals where growth may be lower but 
where emerging market competition and price 
pressures are weaker. Finally, the euro area also 
enjoys a strong position in the export of medium-
high tech machinery, where growth is relatively 
                                                        
(21) For an analysis of the sectoral specialisation of the euro area, 
the US and Japan according to the products’ factor intensity, 
see Quarterly Report on the Euro Area, No 2/2010. 
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fast and competitive pressures can be weathered 
by raising product quality. 
Pre-crisis performance 
The product structure of advanced economies’ 
exports changed significantly during the decade 
preceding the crisis (Table 2.6). The relative 
importance of the machinery and transport sector 
declined in the euro area, the US and Japan, 
reflecting keener competition from emerging 
markets, notably China. There are, however, 
indications that the euro area weathered the rise in 
competition better than the other two regions. The 
decline in the sector’s export share was more 
contained in the euro area than in Japan and 
especially the US, where the share of the sector in 
total exports fell from 54.2 % in 1999 to 36.5 % in 
2011. (22) Over 1999-2007, euro-area exports of 
machinery and transport equipment increased in 
value terms and the trade balance displayed a 
moderate improvement. On the other hand, Japan 
displayed a smaller improvement of the trade 
balance, while the US ran a trade deficit. 
 
Table 2.6: Change in product shares of total 
exports  
(in pp, 1999-2007 and 2007-2011) (1) 
1999
-
2007
2007
-
2011
1999
-
2007
2007
-
2011
1999
-
2007
2007
-
2011
Food, beverages and 
oils
-0.54 0.87 -0.31 0.83 -0.01 0.06
Crude materials 0.26 0.31 1.66 0.69 0.55 0.23
Fuels 2.72 2.30 1.97 4.54 1.01 0.68
Chemicals 1.54 1.10 2.45 0.73 1.77 1.14
Machinery and 
transport equipment
-2.54 -3.20 -6.42 -11.28 -5.40 -4.92
Other manufacturing -1.17 -1.68 0.41 -1.12 -0.09 2.30
Other commodities 
and transactions
-0.26 0.30 0.25 5.61 2.18 0.52
JapanUSEuro area
 
(1) The change in the sectoral share of total exports is expressed 
in percentage points and is the total change over the period of 
reference. 
Source: UN Comtrade, Commission services. 
 
A closer look at the components of the machinery 
and transport equipment sector reveals that the 
comparatively good performance of the euro area 
for the sector as a whole can primarily be traced 
back to non-electrical machinery. Graph 2.5 
shows that while the US appears to have reduced 
                                                        
(22) The changes in the shares of ‘machinery and transport 
equipment’ and of ‘other commodities and transactions’ in 
total US exports over the period 2007-2011 are partly 
overestimated due to the reclassification of certain items. 
its specialisation in this sub-sector, the euro-area 
export share increased moderately in the years 
preceding the global economic crisis. 
Developments were somewhat less favourable 
with other machinery components. The euro area 
registered a significant decline in the share of 
ICT, less steep than in Japan but comparable with 
what was observed in the US (Graph 2.6). (23) The 
euro-area share of cars in total exports was 
broadly stable over the period, while it increased 
moderately in the US and especially in Japan. 
Graph 2.5: Share of non-electrical machinery in 
total exports (in %, 1999-2011) 
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Source: UN Comtrade, Commission services. 
 
Graph 2.6: Share of ICT in total exports 
(in %, 1999-2011) 
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Source: UN Comtrade, Commission services. 
                                                        
(23) ICT goods are here defined as office machines and automatic 
data-processing machines and telecommunications and 
sound-recording and reproducing apparatus and equipment, 
based on the 2-digit SITC codes 75 and 76. 
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The euro-area’s already strong position in exports 
of chemicals improved further in pre-crisis years. 
Within this sector, the fastest export growth was 
experienced by medicinal and pharmaceutical 
products, in terms of both value and market shares 
(Graph 2.7). Exports of pharmaceuticals also 
increased in the US. Nevertheless, the 
pharmaceuticals trade balances in the US and 
Japan showed a sizeable deterioration over the 
period, while the euro-area trade balance 
improved steadily, suggesting a stronger 
competitive position of the euro area in this key 
high-tech sector. 
Graph 2.7: Euro-area exports of medicinal and 
pharmaceutical products 
(1999-2011) 
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Source: Commission services. 
During the pre-crisis period, the share of mineral 
fuels in total exports increased in all three major 
advanced economies. However, all three regions 
displayed a large and widening negative net trade 
balance (the largest being in the euro area). 
Fluctuations in the balance reflect the 
developments in world oil prices and the 
economic cycle. 
Finally, looking at comparative advantage by 
factor intensity over the period 1999-2007, there 
is some evidence of a decline in the euro-area’s 
specialisation in labour-intensive exports, such as 
leather, textiles and clothes, and a shift towards 
raw material-intensive goods and some capital-
intensive goods such as rubber and metals. 
However, the euro area still maintains a higher 
export specialisation in labour-intensive goods 
than the US and Japan. The share of research-
intensive exports in total exports also declined in 
all three regions but to a lesser extent in the euro 
area. 
 
Table 2.7: Change in sectoral shares of total 
exports classified by factor intensity 
(in pp, 1999-2007 and 2007-2011) (1) 
1999
-
2007
2007
-
2011
1999
-
2007
2007
-
2011
1999
-
2007
2007
-
2011
Raw material-
intensive
2.69 3.60 3.26 8.00 1.75 1.00
Labour-intensive -3.15 -1.50 -0.36 0.28 -1.50 0.19
Capital-intensive 2.16 -0.90 1.39 -0.54 5.52 -2.97
Research-intensive -1.70 -1.21 -4.30 -7.75 -5.76 1.77
Euro area US Japan
 
(1) The change in the sectoral shares of total exports is expressed 
in percentage points and is the total change over the period of 
reference. 
Source: UN Comtrade, Commission services. 
 
Post-crisis developments 
Reflecting different sensitivities to the cycle, 
sectoral exports have been affected unevenly by 
the global crisis. The sharp drop in exports in 
2008-09 has been followed by a strong rebound, 
but activity in a number of sectors is still below its 
pre-crisis peak. Exports of intermediate goods and 
capital goods declined sharply in the early stages 
of the crisis, while exports of consumption goods, 
typically more resilient to crises, were less 
severely affected. Nevertheless, when passenger 
cars are added to consumption goods, the slump in 
exports of consumption goods was much more 
pronounced (Graph 2.8). 
Graph 2.8: Extra-euro area exports by sector 
(volume indices, January 2008 = 100) (1) 
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(1) Six-month moving average. 
Source: Commission services. 
Besides short-term cyclical considerations, there 
are concerns that the global crisis may have 
lasting effects on some sectors. In the context of a 
balance sheet crisis characterised by protracted 
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deleveraging processes in a number of advanced 
countries, persistent downside pressures on 
demand for investment goods and durable goods 
can be expected. This is visible to some extent in 
the most recent trade data. It is obviously difficult 
at this stage to disentangle cyclical from structural 
changes in exports, but there is evidence pointing 
to persistent effects of the crisis in some sectors. 
In particular, the broad machinery and transport 
sector appears to have been durably affected by 
the crisis. Sectoral exports in value terms in the 
euro area are above their pre-crisis levels, but 
their shares in total exports have dropped by 
3.2 pp since 2007. Even larger declines in the 
relative importance of machinery and transport 
equipment were registered in the US and Japan. 
The demand constraints deriving from the 
deleveraging process have been accompanied by 
supply constraints, with a further intensification of 
competition from China, whose share of 
machinery and transport equipment in total 
exports has been steadily increasing. 
Looking into the components of the broad 
machinery sector, euro-area and Japanese exports 
of non-electrical machinery performed well 
during the crisis, recovering after a large drop in 
2009 both in value terms and as a share of total 
exports. On the other hand, the share of ICT 
products in total euro-area exports is still currently 
1.7 pp below its 2007 level. The ICT sector 
accounts for more than half of the decline in the 
overall machinery and transport sector over the 
period 2007-11, and its sectoral trade balance 
deteriorated further with respect to pre-crisis 
levels. Exports of electrical machinery were also 
affected more strongly by the global economic 
crisis, with a deterioration of the trade balance and 
a 0.7 pp decline of the sectoral share in total 
exports compared with the 2007 level. Finally, the 
global economic crisis has also hit the car 
industry, where the export share in 2011 was still 
below its 2007 level. 
Some sectors have, however, been more resilient 
to the crisis than machinery and transport 
equipment. The share of crude materials and 
mineral fuels in total exports has increased further 
throughout the euro area and in the US and Japan 
since 2007, although trade balances have 
worsened considerably. Exports of foods and 
beverages have increased since the onset of the 
crisis in the euro area as well as in the US and 
Japan. Moreover, since 2007, the increase in euro-
area exports of medicinal and pharmaceutical 
products has accelerated. 
Overall, the global economic crisis appears to 
have left a lasting mark on a range of investment 
and durable goods sectors, amplifying pre-crisis 
weaknesses. An exception is the non-electrical 
machinery sector, where the euro area maintains 
its traditional comparative advantage. 
2.4. Conclusion 
The share of euro-area exports in total world trade 
has been declining since the late 1990s. The trend 
has been visible in the US and Japan too and has 
been, to some extent, less rapid than in those two 
economies. It reflects the rapid integration of 
emerging economies into world trade but also 
euro exchange rate developments. There is no 
evidence that the crisis has accelerated the losses 
in euro-area market share observed in the decade 
preceding the crisis: since 2010, the market share 
has shown signs of stabilisation, mostly as a result 
of a significant depreciation of the euro. 
There is, however, some evidence that the crisis 
has affected the structure of euro-area exports. It 
seems to have accelerated the pre-crisis shift 
towards emerging markets, where demand has 
proved much more resilient than in advanced 
economies. It also seems to have accelerated the 
declining importance of some traditional 
advanced partners where deleveraging (sometimes 
compounded by exchange rate developments) is 
hampering demand for euro-area exports. Overall, 
however, projected changes in world import 
demand patterns over the next few years, with in 
particular a deceleration in China (where the euro 
area is less present than Japan) and a strong 
rebound of new EU Member States (where the 
euro area is comparatively strong) are such that 
geographical specialisation should not be much 
less supportive in the euro area than in the US or 
Japan. 
The potential lasting impact of the crisis is 
probably more visible and challenging at the 
sectoral level. The euro area has a strong 
comparative advantage in exports of medium-high 
tech machinery and of chemicals, particularly 
pharmaceuticals. Partly due to its strong position 
in pharmaceutical products, the euro-area’s 
overall export performance in chemicals seems to 
have been little affected by the global economic 
crisis. By contrast, the situation of the machinery 
and transport equipment sector appears more 
difficult. Largely due to keener competition from 
emerging markets, notably China, the share of the 
sector in total euro-area exports declined 
significantly during the decade preceding the 
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crisis. As a result of the ongoing deleveraging 
trend in some parts of the world (and related 
constraints on demand for investment equipment 
and durables), the crisis seems to have exerted 
additional pressure on the sector. The recent 
decline in machinery and transport export shares 
was more contained than in other advanced  
countries, such as the US and Japan, suggesting 
that the euro area is tackling this challenge 
comparatively well. However, while the 
competitive position of non-electrical machinery 
seems to remain comparatively strong, the crisis 
has further weakened the position of the ICT, 
electrical machinery and car sectors. 
3. A closer look at some drivers of trade performance at 
Member State level 
 
- 29 - 
Chapter II of this report provides an assessment of 
the overall trade performance of the euro area. 
This aggregate picture conceals substantial 
country differences, however. The present chapter 
therefore takes a closer look at the trade 
performance of euro-area Member States, 
emphasising in particular those countries currently 
engaged in a process of rebalancing large current 
account deficits. It aims to gain a better 
understanding of the role of some key structural 
factors underpinning trade performance and their 
possible contribution to external rebalancing. 
Section 3.1 evaluates the import content of 
exports across Member States. While empirical 
analyses of trade performance frequently focus 
exclusively on exports, understanding the 
contribution of exports to the trade balance 
requires an evaluation of their import content. 
Section 3.2 presents a shift-share decomposition 
that disentangles the roles of Member States’ 
geographical and sectoral specialisations. It also 
discusses the links between export market share 
gains and price or non-price competitiveness and 
reviews the recent empirical literature on non-
price competitiveness factors. Section 3.3 then 
draws conclusions and offers some policy 
insights. 
3.1. Import content of exports 
Deducting embedded intermediate inputs from 
gross exports — determining the import content 
of exports — is important for a proper assessment 
of competitiveness and of current account 
rebalancing challenges. 
The methodology used to calculate the import 
content of exports is described in Box 3.1. A 
summary picture of the results is presented in 
Graph 3.1, which shows (24) the import content as 
a percentage of the total value of exports for the 
economy at large. It therefore includes all 
industries, from agriculture to services. Three 
main findings emerge: 
 In all Member States, the import content of 
exports is far from negligible. A rise in exports 
therefore entails an increase in imports of 
intermediate goods, which mitigates 
significantly the expected effect of exports on 
the trade balance. 
 For most countries in the sample, the import 
content is rising over time, which reveals the 
increasing role of international value chains in 
modern economies. 
 There is a wide variation across countries, 
which could be partly driven by size or 
sectoral structure. 
The import content of exports in 2005 in the euro 
area ranged from 26 % in Greece to 52 % in 
Estonia. More than a quarter of the value of 
exports thus consists of intermediate inputs 
imported, with this share being substantially 
                                                        
(24) The estimates are based on data from Eurostat Input-Output 
tables. Since the latest data available vary across countries, 
the years 1995 and 2005 have generally been taken to 
harmonise the presentation of results. Exceptions include: 
Estonia (1997), Hungary and Ireland (1998), and Bulgaria, 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia (2000). 
This chapter takes a closer look at some drivers of the trade performance of individual euro-area Member 
States. It shows that the import content of exports is high and rising, particularly in smaller Member States. 
This has important implications for the impact of exports on growth and the trade balance. Decomposition of 
export growth based on a constant-market share technique shows that country differences in export 
performance are mainly driven by market share gains or losses within geographical destinations and product 
markets, with the overall geographical and sectoral specialisation playing only a modest role. There is some 
persistence in export performance over time, with market share gains within geographical destinations and 
product markets in pre-crisis years correlated with gains since the crisis. This inertia in export performance is 
a factor that could contribute to the persistence of external imbalances. And there does not seem to be any 
trade-off between strategies which enhance product competitiveness horizontally (across all geographical 
markets) and those which may customise products to local needs or tastes in destination countries. Finally, 
export performance appears to be only partly related to price competitiveness, leaving an important 
explanatory role for non-price competitiveness. In a policy perspective, strategies to rebalance current account 
deficits should aim to enhance both price and non-price competitiveness, with a key role to be played by 
increased competition in the service sector, export promotion programmes and the promotion of R&D and 
skilled labour. 
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higher in a number of countries. Small countries 
tend to be more open to trade and to post a higher 
import content, while France, Germany and Italy 
are all at the bottom of the euro-area ranking. (25) 
In addition to size, the diversity of these shares 
may also be related to the sectoral structure of the 
economy. An example is Greece, where the 
comparatively low import content of exports 
could be explained, at least partly, by the fact that 
the economy is more oriented towards services. 
Outside the euro area, a similar explanation holds 
for the low import intensity of UK exports. 
The import content of exports increases 
significantly between the two years considered in 
Graph 3.1, and the trend is further confirmed by 
results for more recent years available for a few 
countries. Annual data for Germany and Finland 
also show that the upward trend is steady, 
although the lack of data for 2010 means that the 
impact of the crisis cannot be analysed. The trend 
is strongly driven by the process of globalisation 
and the organisation of production around global 
value chains (GVCs), a development which is 
more apparent when analysed at firm and industry 
level. (26) 
For the EU as a whole the import content of 
exports is substantially lower (13.5 %) than for 
individual countries. This shows the significant 
                                                        
(25) The rank correlation coefficient (Spearman) between the 
import content of exports for the whole economy and GDP is 
negative (−0.57) and statistically significant. 
(26) Gereffi, G., J. Humphrey and T. Sturgeon (2005), ‘The 
governance of global value chains’, Review of International 
Political Economy, Vol. 12, No 1, 2005. 
role of the internal market in terms of the supply 
of intermediate inputs for the production of 
exports by EU countries. On average for the 
period 1999–2011, 70 % of the intermediate 
inputs used by industries in EU countries were 
imported from other EU countries. Imports of 
intermediate inputs are not just a leakage of 
activity towards partner countries, but also a 
factor of competitiveness to the extent that the 
economy has access to better quality inputs. 
The import content of exports shows a high 
variation across industries within a country as the 
internationalisation of the production process is 
more developed in some industries than in others. 
For instance, in Germany the import content of 
exports ranges from 3.7 % (other services) to 
81.6 % (coke, refined petroleum products and 
nuclear fuels), for an overall average of 28.5 %. 
While these are extreme cases, there is still 
substantial variation across industries: 
manufacturing and transport activities are above 
the average, while, as expected, all the other 
services industries are below the average. 
Although there is a positive correlation between 
the import content of exports at industry level in 
different countries, there is still substantial 
variation in the proportion of imported inputs used 
by the same industry across countries. This 
reflects the above-mentioned country size effect 
and the different position of countries in the 
GVCs. For example, in computers and office 
equipment the import content of exports ranges 
from 19.8 % (EL) to 88 % (IE) and in electrical 
machinery from 25.5 % (DE) to 68.4 % (EE). For 
the same industries — and as expected — France, 
 
 
Box 3.1: Calculating the import content of exports
The import content of exports refers to the intermediate inputs of foreign origin which are, both directly and 
indirectly, embedded in the goods and services exported by the country. The calculation is carried out using the 
input-output tables for EU countries published by Eurostat. The method used is standard and is based on the 
following expression: 
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M is a vector of technical coefficients representing the use of imported intermediate inputs: for each industry it is 
calculated as the ratio of intermediate inputs imported to the gross value of production. Ad is the matrix of technical 
coefficients calculated from the matrix of intermediate transactions for domestic products. X is a vector of exports of 
domestic products and Xt is the total value of exports. The number of industries is 59. 
This expression provides the import content of exports for the economy at large. The results by industry, which 
underlie the overall figure, provide interesting insights into the interpretation of the results. As the calculation uses 
basically the intermediate flows matrix, the import content of exports does not include the imports of capital goods 
used, as part of the capital stock of the economy, in the production of exports. In other words, it does not measure 
the contribution of capital of foreign origin used to produce goods and services exported.  
 
 
3. A closer look at some drivers of trade performance at Member State level 
 
- 31 - 
Germany and Italy exhibit lower uses of imported 
intermediate inputs than the other countries. 
The analysis presented here also has implications 
in terms of assessing the needs of Member States 
with current account imbalances. For the euro-
area countries, an increase in exports will trigger 
imports of intermediate inputs amounting, on 
average, to 38.7 % of the value of exports. For 
those countries with a high current account 
deficit, it is clear that, with the exception of 
Greece (26 %), a quite significant share of export 
activity leaks to other countries via imports: 
35.7 % (ES), 40.1 % (PT) and 51.8 % (EE). While 
this has been identified as being part of the 
internationalisation strategy of businesses, the 
implications for correcting macroeconomic 
external imbalances cannot be neglected. 
Likewise, the contribution of exports to growth 
should be reassessed in the light of these results. 
3.2. Export performance in product and 
geographical markets 
Graph 3.2 shows the nominal export growth of 
euro-area countries net of global nominal import 
growth. It covers both pre-crisis years (2000-07) 
and developments since the crisis (2007-10) and 
gives an idea of Member States’ market share 
gains (when net export growth is positive) or 
losses (when net export growth is negative) over 
the two periods. 
There are clearly large differences in Member 
States’ export performance over the two periods. 
To shed some light on the drivers of these 
differences, a shift-share analysis is applied. 
There are simple techniques to decompose the 
growth rates of exports into easy-to-interpret 
components. The decomposition used in this 
chapter allows us to estimate the contributions of 
four basic components. The first two consist in 
two structural factors: the geographical and 
commodity composition of exports — i.e. whether 
a country is specialised in sectors with dynamic 
global demand and whether destination countries 
are dynamic markets (see Box 3.2). These two 
components are labelled respectively the initial 
geographical and product specialisations (ISG 
and ISP). The two specialisation components can 
be seen as the outcome of past successful export 
strategies and competitive advantage. For the 
period under analysis they are, however, 
considered as exogenous. 
Graph 3.2: Export growth net of global import 
growth, euro-area Member States (in pp) (1) 
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Source: Commission services' calculations based on UN 
COMTRADE data. 
The two remaining components are performance 
within product markets and within geographical 
markets. They show how successful a country has 
Graph 3.1: Import content of exports, EU Member States (in %) 
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Source: Commission services' calculations. Bulgaria: OECD STAN database. 
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been in increasing its exports above market 
growth in destination countries and in products. 
These two factors can be labelled market share 
gains in geographical destinations (MSGG) and 
in products  (MSGP) and reflect a country’s 
export strategy within geographical and product 
markets, e.g. sufficient or insufficient 
customisation to local tastes, too high or 
competitive prices of standardised goods, or high 
or low quality of higher-end goods. Hence, the 
market share gain components reflect both price 
competitiveness developments (a typically 
successful strategy when competing in markets 
for standardised goods or in lower-income 
markets) and non-price competitiveness 
(important when competing in higher-income 
destination countries or in differentiated 
products). 
Patterns in export decomposition across the 
Member States 
The results of this decomposition for each 
Member State and for the periods 2000-07 and 
2007-11 are presented in Table 3.1. A number of 
statistical patterns can be observed based on the 
correlations between the export growth 
components across countries (Graph 3.3). 
First, performance shows inertia across the four 
components. This is particularly true for market 
share gains within product and geographical 
markets (MSGP and MSGP), with correlations in 
performance over the two periods (2000-07 and 
2007-11) of 0.8 and 0.6 respectively (upper panels 
of Graph 3.3). So there seems to be some degree 
of persistence in export performance, especially in 
competitive performance in products. Though not 
a surprising finding — after all a country’s 
competitiveness does not change overnight — it 
also contributes to the persistence of external 
imbalances. 
Second, there is a very strong positive link 
between competitive performance within product 
markets (MSGP) and within geographical markets 
(MSGG), with a correlation above 0.9 (lower 
panels of Graph 3.3): Member States which gain 
market shares within their product markets also 
gain market shares within their destinations. So, 
there does not seem to be any trade-off between 
the strategies which enhance product 
competitiveness globally (across all geographical 
markets) and those which may customise products 
to local needs (in terms of price or quality) or 
tastes in destination countries. It is possible that 
exporters in successful Member States are able to 
 
 
Box 3.2: Methodology of shift-share decomposition
The decomposition is carried out using UN COMTRADE import and export data for goods for the years 2000, 2007 
and 2010, for all the available 2-digit HS product categories (about 100). The year 2007 is selected as a borderline 
between the period before the global crisis and the post-crisis period. The export and import growth rates are 
nominal. The importers considered are all the countries available in COMTRADE. The decomposition is subject to 
the following accounting identity: 
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eg  — growth rate of total exports of country e  
g  — growth rate of global imports 
e
iw  — share of exports from country e  to country i  in total exports of country e  
e
sw  — share of exports from country e  in sector s  in total exports of country e  
e
ig  — growth rate of exports from country e  to country i  (of all products) 
e
sg  — growth rate of exports from country e  in sector s  (to all destinations) 

ig  — growth rate of total imports of country i  

sg  — growth rate of global imports in sector s  
Obviously, a positive difference between the export growth of country e  and the global import growth (assumed to 
be equal to global export growth) points to an increase in the global market share of country e . However, that can 
be entirely because of the favourable initial specialisation (geographical component, ISG, or product component, 
ISP). The two other components in the decomposition show whether market shares increased within geographical 
markets and product markets: the market share gains in countries (MSGG) and in products (MSGP) components. 
Consequently, the latter two components represent the competitiveness of exports in the period analysed. The 
growth rate components are calculated for two periods (2000–2007 and 2007–2010) and annualised.  
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produce a wide spectrum of product varieties: 
both those which compete on prices (usually 
preferred in lower-income countries) and those 
which compete on quality (generally with higher 
demand in richer countries). This strong positive 
relationship between MSGP and MSGG is also in 
line with microeconomic empirical evidence, 
which shows that high-productivity firms are 
better at competing both on prices and on quality 
and at serving more geographical markets, both 
richer and more difficult markets (e.g. in terms of 
physical or cultural distance). (27) 
Finally, there is only a weak correlation between 
the contributions to export growth of initial 
product composition (ISP) and geographical 
destination composition (ISG). In other words, 
being specialised in fast growing geographical 
destinations says little about being active in fast-
growing product markets, and vice versa. 
                                                        
(27) Bastos, P. and J. Silva (2010), ‘The quality of a firm’s 
exports: Where you export to matters,’ Journal of 
International Economics, Vol. 82, No 2, pp. 99-111. 
Similarly, the relationships between the initial 
specialisation components and the respective 
market share gain components are relatively weak 
and mixed. Benefiting from a good specialisation 
does not necessarily mean a strong capacity to 
gain market shares on individual markets. 
Results of a cluster analysis 
To make a more systematic analysis of the main 
country differences in the shift-share 
decomposition, a hierarchical clustering method 
can be used. In order to shed some light on 
possible differences between euro-area and other 
EU Member States, the analysis is applied to all 
EU Member States. (28) 
As shown in Graph 3.5, the method allows us to 
distinguish between three country groups. The 
three groups can be characterised by their median 
performance and dispersion in each of the four 
                                                        
(28) Clusters are formed using Ward’s method. Distance is 
Euclidean distance. 
Graph 3.3: Correlations of export growth components, EU Member States  
(all market share gains in pp) 
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Correlation: 0.64
AT
BE
BG
CY
CZ
DK
EE
FI
FR
DE
EL
HU
IE
IT
LV LT
LU
MT
NL
PL
PT
RO
SK
SI
ES
SE
UK
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
-6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
M
ar
ke
t s
ha
re
 g
ai
ns
 in
 p
ro
du
ct
s,
 2
00
7
-2
01
0 
Market share gains in geographical destinations, 2007 - 2010
Correlation: 0.95
AT
BE
BG
CY
CZ
DK
EE
FI
FR
DE
EL
HU
IE
IT
LV
LT
LU
MT
NL
PL
PT
RO
SK
SI
ES
SE
UK
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
-15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15
M
ar
ke
t s
ha
re
 g
ai
ns
 in
 p
ro
du
ct
s,
 2
00
0 
-
20
07
 
Market share gains in geographical destinations, 2000-2007
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Source: Commission services' calculations based on UN COMTRADE data. 
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components of the shift-share analysis in the two 
periods investigated (Graph 3.4). The first group 
(starting from the right in Graph 3.5) consists only 
of Member States that joined the EU in 2004 or 
later (but not all of them). These Member States 
started from very low export levels and 
experienced rapid catching-up during the decade. 
The second (and largest) group is made up of 
Member States which have generally shown 
comparatively poor export performance over the 
two periods considered (CY, DK, FI, FR, EF, IE, 
IT, LU, MT, PT, SE, UK). A third group consists 
of mostly advanced countries with relatively 
strong export performance (e.g. AT, DE, BE, ES, 
EE, HU, SI, NL). The clustering does not allow a 
clear distinction to be drawn between euro-area 
and other EU Member States. 
Graph 3.4 points to large differences between the 
groups in terms of market share components of 
the shift-share decomposition. Although there are 
some group differences in terms of the 
contribution of the geographical and product 
specialisation components (ISP and ISG), it turns 
out that the product market share gain components 
(MSGP and MSGG) are much more important for 
explaining export growth differences. This 
relative pattern seems to be stable over time. This 
means that the deep global crisis, which is partly 
captured by the figures for the second period, did 
not change the general qualitative picture, 
although it obviously had an impact at the overall 
average level of export growth. Finally, it is 
interesting to note that the second group (low 
performers) did worse than the other two groups 
in terms of market share gains within both product 
and destination markets. 
Developments since the global economic crisis 
Turning to developments since the crisis, (29) 
although most Member States have suffered from 
the crisis and seen their overall market share 
performance deteriorate significantly relative to 
the pre-crisis trends, large country differences are 
again noticeable. Larger countries have generally 
kept their ranks in terms of export performance 
relatively stable whereas the relative positions of 
smaller countries have been more volatile. This 
higher volatility for small countries may reflect 
their dependence on relatively fewer products 
(due to scale effects in manufacturing) and less 
diversified trading partners, both leading to a 
lower degree of export diversification. There are, 
however, exceptions to this general volatility 
difference between large and small countries: 
Italy is one of the countries with the largest 
relative deterioration. 
                                                        
(29) As in the previous section the most recent year covered by 
the analysis is 2010. 
 
Table 3.1: The shift-share components of net export growth, euro area Member States (in pp) (1) 
ISG (2) ISP (2) MSGG (2) MSGP (2) ISG (2) ISP (2) MSGG (2) MSGP (2)
Intial 
geographical 
specialisation
Initial product 
specialisation
Market share 
gains in 
geographical 
destinations
Market share 
gains in product 
markets
Intial 
geographical 
specialisation
Initial product 
specialisation
Market share 
gains in 
geographical 
destinations
Market share 
gains in product 
markets
AT 1.3 -0.4 0.2 1.9 -1.0 -0.9 -1.3 -1.4
BE 0.2 0.4 1.0 0.9 -1.0 0.0 -1.0 -2.1
CY 4.7 -1.0 -12.0 -2.2 -1.7 0.3 1.0 -0.9
DE 1.1 -0.4 0.8 2.2 -0.9 -0.7 -0.7 -0.9
EE 4.0 -0.8 1.2 5.5 -1.7 -0.7 2.4 1.4
EL 3.2 0.2 -4.3 -0.6 -1.4 0.1 -1.2 -2.7
ES 0.1 -0.2 0.4 0.7 -1.0 -0.6 -0.8 -1.1
FI 2.1 -0.8 -4.4 -0.8 -0.5 -0.6 -4.6 -4.4
FR 0.8 -0.1 -3.4 -2.2 -1.0 -0.3 -1.2 -1.9
IE -0.9 -0.1 -3.1 -4.1 -1.4 0.5 -0.2 -2.2
IT 1.0 -0.6 -1.7 0.1 -1.0 -0.5 -2.2 -2.6
LU 0.3 1.0 -1.1 -2.0 -1.2 -1.3 -2.4 -2.4
MT -1.8 -1.7 -5.6 -5.7 -0.4 0.4 -0.6 -1.4
NL 0.6 0.2 2.6 2.9 -1.2 0.1 0.5 -0.8
PT 0.4 -1.3 -2.2 -0.5 -2.1 -0.6 0.3 -1.2
SI 2.2 -0.2 3.2 5.3 -1.6 -0.8 -1.0 -1.8
SK 3.1 0.3 11.0 12.6 -1.2 -1.0 2.0 1.8
2007–20102000–2007
 
(1) Net export growth is nominal export growth net of nominal world import growth. 
(2) Component acronym, see Box 3.2. 
Source: Commission services' calculations based on UN COMTRADE data. 
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with high or medium external deficits, (30) the 
dynamism of destination countries (ISG) has 
generally made a negative contribution since the 
start of the crisis — not surprisingly given the 
large share of exports going to other sluggish EU 
economies in that group. The role of product 
composition (ISP) is mixed, with some deficit 
countries benefiting from the dynamism (though 
moderate) of their export basket (notably CY, 
MT, IE and, to a lesser extent, EL) — while the 
rest suffered from specialisation in products 
facing below-average global demand. The 
contribution from the components reflecting 
countries’ market share gains in product (MSGP) 
and geographical markets (MSGG) is negative for 
all deficit countries, with the notable exception of 
Slovakia, which shows significant market share 
gains over the post-crisis period (also before the 
crisis), and Cyprus, whose negative performance 
in terms of product market shares is offset by 
market share gains in destination countries. 
Overall, although the effect of a given 
geographical and sectoral specialisation may 
change over time, reflecting shifts in the 
geographical and product drivers of global trade, 
the results of the analysis of recent years suggest 
                                                        
(30) These countries have already started their adjustment process, 
in some cases quite significantly. 
 
Graph 3.5: Country clusters based on the export 
growth components of the shift-share analysis 
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Countries marked in bold font belong to the first cluster, those in 
normal font to the second cluster, and those in italics to the third 
cluster in the three-cluster classification used in the following 
analysis. The dissimilarity scale is square-root transformed. 
Source: Commission services calculations based on UN 
COMTRADE data. 
that the specialisation of deficit countries will not 
be a major help in the correction of external 
imbalances and that persistent losses in individual 
Graph 3.4: The performance of country clusters in each of the export growth components of the shift-share 
analysis in the two periods (in pp) (1) 
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(1) Horizontal lines inside the boxes represent medians, the bottoms and the tops of the boxes represent the 25th and the 75th percentiles, 
and the ‘whisker’ lines represent the Tukey adjacent values. 
Source: Commission services' calculations based on UN COMTRADE data. 
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market shares are a reflection of deep-seated 
competitiveness problems (both price and non-
price) in these countries. 
Price vs non-price competitiveness 
A final important issue is the extent to which 
market share gain contributions to export growth 
can be explained by cost developments. The 
correlations between the two market share gain 
components (MSGG and MSGP) and the changes 
in the real effective exchange rate (REER) in the 
same period are negative but small in absolute 
terms (around −0.2 overall) for the euro-area 
countries. The role of cost factors in shaping 
exports in 2007–2010 seems even slightly weaker 
than in the period 2000–2007. Note, however, that 
accumulated REER appreciations were so large in 
some countries before the onset of the crisis that 
even a low elasticity of exports to price factors 
could translate into large export losses. In 
addition, the correlations above are based on a 
cross-country relation and assume the same 
sensitivity of exports to the REER for each 
country. (31) However, exports may react 
differently in different Member States, for 
example due to different product composition. (32) 
Still, it appears that non-price factors have been 
important determinants of Member State 
differences in export performance over the past 
decade. These results signal that strategies for 
successfully correcting external deficits in the 
euro area should combine ongoing price-
competitiveness gains with policies aimed at 
developing non-price competitiveness. However, 
policies to develop non-price competitiveness 
may require a longer timescale to fully deliver 
their effects. 
As regards new Member States, both export and 
cost developments strongly reflect the catching-up 
process, resulting in positive, though generally 
weak, correlations between market share gain 
contributions to export growth and changes in the 
REER. 
Given the importance of non-price 
competitiveness factors, Box 3.3 presents a 
review of recent empirical work on the drivers of 
export performance. It points to the importance of 
the extensive margin (new firms engaging in 
export activities as well as entering new 
                                                        
(31) The correlation between exports and the real exchange rate is 
typically significantly higher when estimated for individual 
countries than in country cross-sections as here. 
(32) As some products are more sensitive to price fluctuations 
than others. 
destinations and supplying new products) for 
long-term trade performance and the positive 
impact of R&D, innovation and high-skilled 
labour on export growth. FDI, the quality of 
infrastructure and services and the quality of 
institutions also emerge as important factors of 
competitiveness. 
3.3. Some policy implications 
The results presented in this chapter underscore 
the need to take into consideration, from a policy 
perspective, structural and microeconomic 
(industry and ultimately firm-level) mechanisms 
that underlie a country’s trade performance. In the 
current macroeconomic context, where many 
Member States in the euro area still have to go 
through a significant adjustment of their external 
imbalances, a better understanding of factors 
behind performance in external trade would help 
gauge the effort required and its sustainability. 
The development of global value chains goes 
along with increasing trade in intermediate inputs. 
In this context, traditional sectoral specialisation 
at country level, as measured using only export 
figures, provides only a partial picture as the 
specialisation strategies of firms and industries are 
increasingly dependent on their insertion in 
GVCs, in which imports play a significant role. In 
assessing the contribution of exports to the 
rebalancing of current account deficits, the rising 
importance of imported intermediate inputs needs 
to be taken into account. Greater insertion in 
GVCs entails a lower direct contribution of 
exports to growth and jobs, but as increased 
sourcing abroad should have a positive effect on a 
country’s competitiveness it should also foster 
exporting activities and, ultimately, have a 
positive impact on growth and on trade 
imbalances. 
Decomposing export growth using the constant-
market share technique has shown that there 
seems to be some persistence in export 
performance, especially in market share gains in 
products. There is therefore a risk that the weak 
export performance observed in some Member 
States may be corrected only slowly, a factor 
which may contribute to the persistence of 
external imbalances. Moreover, there does not 
seem to be any trade-off between the strategies 
which enhance product competitiveness 
horizontally (across all geographical markets) and 
those which may customise products to local 
needs (in terms of prices or product 
characteristics) in destination countries. Finally,  
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Box 3.3: Recent literature on the determinants of export performance
Most recent research on export performance extends the theoretical models rooted in Krugman’s new trade theory 
and Melitz’s model of heterogeneous firms and tests them empirically. These modern trade models highlight the 
differences across markets, firms and products even within the same sector. This box reviews a number of recent 
contributions in this area, distinguishing between five groups of determinants of exports. 
Geographical and product diversification 
Besedeš and Prusa (2011) argue that there is scope for expansion of the extensive margin in exports of both 
standardised goods and differentiated products. Analyses for Spain indicate that short-run changes in exports are 
driven by the intensive margin (i.e. increases in exports by incumbent firms within established trade linkages). In the 
long run, both the intensive and the extensive margins (the latter consisting of net entry of firms and product-country 
switching) are equally important (De Lucio et al., 2011). According to evidence from the UK, exports tend to 
stabilise firms’ sales through market diversification. While more volatile firms — including probably those with 
innovative products — are more likely to face financial constraints and to go bankrupt, they have more incentives to 
start exporting (García-Vega et al., 2012). However, when faced with multiple destinations to which they can 
export, many firms will choose to sequentially export in order to slowly learn more about their chances of success in 
untested markets (Nguyen, 2012). Therefore, there may be some persistence in the extensive margin. 
Product differentiation, innovation, and human capital 
Di Pietro and Anoruo (2006) find that the level of innovation and technology in a country, the amount of 
technological transfer from other countries, and the magnitude of business startups are positively correlated with 
exports. Faruq (2010) provides evidence that the export of high-quality differentiated goods to the US is associated 
with research and development activities. Munch and Skaksen (2008) show that firms may escape intense 
competition from low-wage countries in international markets by using high-skilled workers to undertake or 
improve innovation, design or branding and thereby to differentiate their products. The importance of human capital 
for exports is also supported by Contractor and Mudambi (2008). In particular, not only product upgrades but also 
innovations in production and distribution processes can have a positive impact on exports (Leon-Ledesma, 2002). 
Imports and foreign direct investment 
Across industries, imports can be a source of inputs used in exports but they can also be an important part of 
competition in intra-industry trade. The knowledge spillovers (Bitzer and Geishecker, 2006) or the positive 
disciplining effects (Kee and Hoekman, 2007) appear to be stronger than the negative impact due to ‘market 
stealing’. Concerning foreign direct investment (FDI), Alfaro and Charlton (2009) show empirically that 
multinationals invest abroad to lower the cost of multistage production. Hence, FDI stimulates exporting rather than 
substituting it. In countries that are members of large free-trade areas, such as the EU, the link between trade and 
FDI may be particularly strong, because foreign firms can establish plants in one country to serve the whole area 
freely and exploit scale economies (Neary, 2009). The Member States that joined the EU in 2004 have attracted 
plenty of FDI, to a large extent thanks to their accession. The strong export performance of these countries can be 
better explained when FDI inflows are accounted for (Allard, 2009). Positive spillovers from FDI to exports are 
reported in the empirical literature even for a mature economy such as the UK (Greenaway et al., 2004; Girma et al., 
2007), likely because of the positive impact on productivity (Haskel et al., 2007). Also cross-country regressions 
confirm the positive role of FDI for exports (De Clercq et al., 2008; Tebaldi, 2011). 
The quality of services 
Empirical investigations have shown that plentiful, high-quality transport infrastructure and high-quality information 
and communications services facilitate exports (Shepherd and Wilson, 2009). Better financial systems can increase 
the chances of successful innovation and can act as a facilitator for starting exports (Berman and Hericourt, 2009). 
Wolfmayr (2008) confirms a significant positive correlation between international service linkages mainly related to 
high-skilled, technology-driven industries and export market shares. Francois and Woerz (2008) show that imported 
services are important inputs stimulating exports in skill- and technology-intensive industries. 
The quality of institutions 
Moenius and Berkowitz (2004) find that improvements in the quality of institutions increase the share and volume 
of exports of differentiated, high-value added products through stronger enforcement of contracts and better  
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export underperformance seems to result mainly 
from market share losses within geographical 
destinations and product markets rather than from 
wrong initial specialisation. These geographical 
and product market share gains reflect the 
competitive advantage of the countries concerned 
during the period under consideration and are only 
partly determined by price or cost advantages. 
This chapter does not provide a systematic 
analysis of non-price competitiveness factors. 
However, a careful reading of the economic 
literature points to a number of areas where policy 
action can support long-term export growth. 
One such area is services. Services can be 
important inputs in exported differentiated 
product ‘bundles’ (e.g. after-sales support services 
or training) as well as trade facilitators (e.g. 
Box (continued) 
 
protection of property rights. The significant role of institutions for long-term export performance is also pointed out 
by Alvarez (2011). The quality of institutions, such as the regulatory framework and public administration, may be 
particularly important for the export of manufacturing goods (Méon and Sekkat, 2008). Nicolini (2011) presents 
evidence that institutional quality, in the form of contract enforcement by the judicial system, may be a source of 
comparative advantage, especially in those industries which are more contract-intensive. The impact in relationship-
specific and complex-task-intensive sectors is larger in developed countries. She also notes that although 
institutional comparative advantage is not a ‘new’ development, institutional comparative advantages seem to gain 
relevance over time. 
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transport, communication, or financial services). 
Therefore, increasing competition in the services 
sectors would improve the cost-competitiveness 
and quality of services and ultimately support 
export performance. 
Promoting business research and development and 
the supply of skilled labour may boost the 
creation of new products and foster exports of 
higher-end varieties of goods where price 
competition is less pronounced and competitive 
advantages more durable. 
Export promotion programmes also have a role to 
play. They may influence the extensive margin 
(i.e. induce non-exporting firms to engage in 
exports, and encourage exporting firms to extend 
the range of destinations and enter new product 
markets), especially if a comprehensive set of 
services is offered. (33) Such policies can, for 
instance, aim to provide exporters with more 
information on emerging markets so as to reduce  
                                                        
(33) Martincus, C. V. and J. Carballo (2010), ‘Export promotion: 
Bundled services work better,’ World Economy, Vol. 33, 
No 12, pp. 1718-1756. Dennis, A. and B. Shepherd (2011), 
‘Trade facilitation and export diversification,’ World 
Economy, Vol. 34, No 1, pp. 101-122. 
the information asymmetries and the cost of 
expanding the extensive margin. The 
diversification of exports appears to be hindered 
by market imperfections, such as uncertainty 
about the production costs of new goods, 
uncertainty about the characteristics of foreign 
demand (including e.g. redesigns needed to meet 
foreign standards and tastes), and spillovers from 
the first-mover investments (needed to find out 
how big those costs are and learn the 
characteristics of foreign demand). Hence public 
support for ‘export discoveries’ might be justified. 
Those who can benefit most are companies in the 
initial exporting stages. (34) 
Finally, structural reforms do not usually have 
immediate effects because they operate on the 
supply side of the economy where the reaction is 
gradual — enterprises need to adapt their 
technologies and managerial techniques. (35) This 
calls for policy-makers to act promptly. 
                                                        
(34) Klinger, B. and D. Lederman (2011), ‘Export discoveries, 
diversification and barriers to entry,’ Economic Systems, Vol. 
35, No 1, pp. 64-83. Freixanet, J. (2011), ‘Export promotion 
programs: Their impact on companies’ internationalization 
performance and competitiveness,’ International Business 
Review, forthcoming. 
(35) Mickiewicz, T. (2005), ‘Is the Link between reforms and 
growth spurious? A comment’, William Davidson Institute 
Working Paper, No 775. 
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